Problems of Communism

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Poland's "Road to Socialism"

"A SPECTER is haunting Eastern Europe . . . the specter of humane socialism, and it frightens not only the capitalists but the Stalinists," proclaims an article in the Warsaw newspaper *Przeglad Kulturalny* (Nov. 7, 1956). The concept of "humane socialism," which the Polish Communists regard as their own unique contribution to Marxism-Leninism, may indeed frighten the "Stalinists." But it is dubious whether the "capitalists"—a designation that apparently stands for the entire non-Soviet world—are in the least frightened by it. If anything, they view it quite sympathetically. For among the several ideological programs struggling to fill the void created by the breakdown of the Stalinist mythology, the Polish "road to socialism" certainly represents the most radical departure from Soviet-type totalitarianism. And in its efforts not only to gain national independence, but to change some of the basic features of the system that had been imposed on it, Poland commands, in many respects, the sympathy and support of the outside world.

But sympathy alone is not enough, and support must be conditioned by an intelligent understanding of the phenomenon which the Polish Communists, with romantic abandon, have termed their own "October Revolution." Insofar as independence from Soviet domination is concerned, one need hardly doubt either Polish intentions, or the considerable results achieved thus far. The Poles have never been known for their excessive pro-Russian zeal; nor has the Polish Communist Party—as isolated as it was from the main stream of Polish life during the interwar period—had any reason to feel particularly attached to the "Motherland of the Revolution." The disappearance of a number of leading Polish Communists in the Soviet Union in 1936-38, the dissolution, in 1938, of the Polish CP by the Comintern, the Hitler-Stalin Pact—all these developments helped to deepen the hostility that even the staunchest Polish Communists have felt for their Kremlin overlords. The shattering experience of 1944, when the Soviet Army, poised on the east bank of the Vistula River, refused to grant assistance to General Bor-Komorowski's anti-German uprising, and finally the blatant political domination over and economic exploitation of Poland in the 1945-55 decade cemented the bond of anti-Russian hatred between the population at large on the one hand, and the Polish Communists on the other. The recent agreements between the Soviet and Polish governments, terminating the grossest aspects of Soviet control, have therefore been greeted with enthusiasm by the entire Polish people, Communists and non-Communists alike.

An end to Soviet domination is not all that the Polish Communists desire, however. Recent events have shown that the Polish Communists have genuinely recoiled from the methods and spirit of Stalinism, and have been seriously attempting to revise their entire political and economic system. The atmosphere of ubiquitous and omnipresent terror has been swept away. The secret police has been downgraded, its record exposed, and its reputation thoroughly discredited. During the Poznan trials scores of young defendants, brought up under Communist tutelage, were permitted to describe, in graphic terms, the sickening brutalities of the secret police, and even leading members of the party—some of them with good personal cause—have not been timid in their denunciations of forced confessions, tortures, and the more subtle methods of political terror.

The repudiation of the more sordid facets of Stalinism has gone hand in hand with a general fumigation of the political atmosphere of the country. A whole tradition of lies, distortions, slanders, and myths has been exploded. It can now be openly admitted that the Polish economy has been weak and inefficient, that Polish agriculture has been sagging, that the standard of living has been abysmally low, that public housing is in a deplorable state of neglect. Politically and culturally, the record of the past ten years has now been exposed to the most biting criticism. The extent of the moral reorientation which the Polish intelligentsia has engaged in, for instance, may be gauged from a talk on the Warsaw

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Radio (November 22) by H. Jankowski, in which he denounced Stalinism for equating morality with politics, for creating men that were:

> . . . tools in the hands of superiors, without wits of their own, carrying out without scruples anything they were ordered to . . . In the Stalinist interpretation . . . socialism was an end unto itself, while man was merely a means to it . . . This interpretation caused the Leninist criterion to be transformed into something quite contrary, acquiring a similarity to the dismal principle, "The end justifies the means."

Nothing even remotely resembling this—and there have been many other Polish statements even more outspoken—has appeared in the Soviet press or on the Moscow radio, with their euphemisms about the "cult of personality," "mistakes" and "regrettable distortions," which stand for Byzantine hero worship, disastrous policies, and mass murder.

Side by side with condemning their past, the Polish leaders have also made strenuous efforts to erect a new political structure, and to give the intelligentsia an opportunity to express itself more freely and creatively than hitherto. The stress on heavy industry is being replaced by a more rational economic policy in which consumer goods will receive top priority. Although collectivization of agriculture is still the ultimate goal, *forced* collectivization as such has been abolished, collectives have been allowed to dissolve, and repressive measures against private farming have been withdrawn. The educational system has been revamped, and various youth organizations have been permitted to take the place of the former single ZMB (Polish Youth Union). At the recent Writers' Congress, held at the end of November and beginning of December last year (at which, according to a commentator on the Polish radio, "nobody defended socialist realism" dubbed "beet and tractor literature"), a resolution against press censorship was adopted, and the free dissemination of foreign literature was demanded. The "Polish road to socialism" thus seems to be not mere verbiage, but an institutional and psychological reform of Polish life.

A RECITAL of the events of the past few months, while essential, is not sufficient for the full understanding of the "Polish road to socialism." For a number of questions must be posed: Where does this road lead? What problems are bound to arise in the future? What are its limitations? And most important, does it contain the potentialities not only for the transformation of Stalinism, but for its own gradual metamorphosis into a genuinely democratic system?

While no conclusive answers to these questions can obviously be offered at this time, three factors that have an important bearing on the character and future of Polish communism must be considered. They are: (1) the attitude of the USSR toward the East European "people's democracies" in general and Poland in particular; (2) the ideological program of the Polish Communist leadership; and (3) the dynamic of the Polish revolution *per se*.

The *present* attitude of the Soviet Union would certainly act as a brake on the development of independence and democracy in Poland even if the Polish Communists were wholeheartedly and unqualifiedly in favor of these goals. Soviet acquiescence to Gomulka's return came after a bitter struggle, and it was finally given not only because the Soviets were threatened with a popular uprising, but also because they realized that Poland would still remain within the Soviet orbit. Driven by forces largely beyond their control, Stalin's successors are probably ready to come to terms with the partial dismemberment of their East European empire—but not at any price. The recent stiffening of the Soviet attitude toward the members of the "Socialist Commonwealth," the renewed emphasis on "proletarian internationalism" in lieu of "separate paths to socialism"—a doctrinal shift aimed principally at Yugoslav efforts to usurp Russia's "leading role" in the Communist bloc—would seem to indicate that the price the Soviets are asking now, after Hungary, is greater than before it. *Kommunist's* (No. 18, 1956) comparison of Yugoslav Vice President Edward Kardelj's speech of December 7 with the "yelping made at one time in Russia by Trotskyites and other degenerates" will undoubtedly have its repercussions on Soviet-Polish relations as well. For the time being, then, Moscow may be expected to threaten Poland with action à la Hungary if it "doesn't behave"—even though, at a later date, if faced with an untenable situation in Eastern Europe and at the same time presented with the strategic possibility of withdrawing its troops from those countries without sacrifice of Soviet security, it may yet alter its views to a considerable extent.

IT is the Polish Communists, however, who most clearly laid down the dividing line between what constitutes "humane socialism," and what makes for "bourgeois reactionary tendencies." Continuing in what may be termed a pristine Leninist tradition, Gomulka is no doubt sincerely trying to fashion a system that will, eventually, meet with the support of the entire Polish people. But—again in the Leninist tradition—his attempt has very little in common with the democratic processes of non-dictatorial societies, but rather with an *élitist* approach to politics: a minority is to de-

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cide what is "objectively" good for the people, and act in accordance with it.

Not to understand this is tantamount to not understanding the severe limitations of Poland's "road to socialism." Thus, the Polish press has now denounced the rigged elections of the Stalinist era. Yet if the elections this January are not rigged, they are not free either. There is only one electoral list, under the aegis of the National Front, and the population is allowed to make its choice from among government-approved and screened candidates. Other parties outside the PZPR (United Workers—*i.e.,* Communist—Party) are allowed to function. Yet their role has been formally described as based on "the recognition of the leading role of the PZPR" (Radio Warsaw, November 30), and their aim narrowed down to the building of a "socialist state, a state of worker-peasant alliance of which the working class is the guiding force" (Radio Warsaw, Dec. 12). In other words, while the party does not intend to rule with an iron fist as it did before, it is nonetheless far from giving up its monopoly over the political life of the country. How seriously the Polish CP still considers itself the self-anointed vanguard of the "masses" may be seen from an article that appeared in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) on Nov. 30. According to the author, Zofia Artymowska, there are people in Poland who see the present period as merely the first stage, to be followed by the "bourgeois type of system," with " 'full freedoms' to create political parties of all types." Such a demand "means the reversal of the notion of freedom, because it would mean only freedom for the minority of the nation and not the majority," she concludes, hardly aware, apparently, of mounting formulas that would seem to belong strictly to the Stalinist arsenal of demagogical doubletalk.

Of course, it is possible that, when faced with the necessity of choosing—in the words of the former Yugoslav Titoist Milovan Djilas "The Storm in East Europe," *The New Leader,* New York, Nov. 19, 1956) —"between internal democracy, which is inseparable from complete independence from Moscow, and the ties with Moscow required to maintain the Communists' monoply of power," Gomulka may choose the former. Communists, too, can be reformed, especially if they received some of their basic education in Communist jails—as in the case of the Polish leaders Gomulka and Spychalski. But it is probably safe to assume that for Gomulka to come out against the USSR—paradoxically and in the last analysis the power to bring and later restore him to power—he would have to be borne on the crest of a popular movement (as in the case of Nagy) that would no longer be satisfied with the limited reforms of the present period. Which brings us to the third and last factor previously mentioned.

IF the Hungarian Revolution has driven any lesson home, it is that the mainspring of the revolutionary drive in Eastern Europe is the people—the most direct victims of Stalinism—and not their rulers, local or foreign. Whatever had been the intentions of Nagy and those around him at the earliest stage of the Hungarian uprising, they were far more radical and sweeping by the time the revolution reached its nadir. Not that Nagy had not possibly been a potential Djilas from the very start. But it was only when the dams were broken and when the revolt had gathered momentum that his latent aspirations came to the fore. Similarly, it might even be immaterial to speculate whether Gomulka harbors parallel tendencies. The point is that once some of the essential features of the Stalinist system were removed, once the mystique went up in smoke and the people were given at least *some* opportunity to govern their destinies, the door was opened for not only an amelioration, but for a radical transformation of the Communist system.

In this respect, Poland offers perhaps a unique case within the Soviet orbit. In the USSR, decades of dictatorial rule have bred patterns of authoritarian control and behavior which cannot easily be broken. In most of the satellites, authoritarian rule—if not mentality—is still firmly in the saddle. But in Poland communism may very well have dug its own grave. It is certainly plausible to assume that sooner or later voices will be raised in favor of a genuine multi-party system, for an end to the one-party state in *all* its ramifications. *When* the forces that have been so dramatically released in the past few months will swell into a tide threatening to overturn the Communist order in Poland remains to be seen. There is little doubt that the countervailing factors mentioned above will operate—Soviet interests, as well as the innate tendencies of the Communist regime. But it is more than likely that the day will ultimately arrive when these forces will come to a head. At that time, whatever the immediate outcome, the Soviet empire will be dealt another blow, even more severe and profound than those which have brought it to its present stage of disintegration.

A.B.

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The Tragedy of Hungary

By RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

THE Soviet decision to intervene with force and crush the recent revolution in Hungary is the climax of a story of tragedy, tragedy because the repression might not have occurred. The revolution in its initial aims had not only succeeded in Hungary, it had been accepted in Moscow as an unwanted but hard fact by October 30. By then, however, the violent forces of popular feelings unleashed by the uprising would not be stopped short of the attainment of Hungary's complete independence from communism's yoke: on October 31 the Hungarian people and their leaders drove beyond the point of possible Soviet acceptance and led Moscow to decide upon a course of military intervention and repression.

The Gathering of the Storm

THE immediate background of the Hungarian revolution may be marked from the public rehabilitation of Laszlo Rajk, executed as a "Titoist" in 1949. Rajk's name was quietly restored to grace on March 29, 1956, shortly after Khrushchev's devaluation of Stalin. In May, the Hungarian "little Stalin" Matyas Rakosi was openly criticized in the press, and on July 18 he was replaced as party boss by Ernoe Geroe. Probably influenced by the endorsement of "different roads to socialism" in the Tito-Khrushchev communique of June 20, Geroe upon assuming leadership called for reconciliation with Tito.

On July 21, however, Mikoyan visited Budapest (while Khrushchev and Zhukov went to Warsaw) to promulgate the new and harder Soviet "post-Poznan" line, reflected in the June 30 resolution of the CPSU Central Committee on tighter discipline among foreign Communists, and also expressed in an attack by *Pravda* of July 16 on the concept of "national communism." By September Moscow felt it necessary to send a secret directive to the satellite leaders stating plainly that the USSR, not Yugoslavia, was to be the model for satellite development. It was this directive which led to Yugoslav reactions culminating in Khruschev's visit to Belgrade and Tito's to the Crimea in September. Geroe also went to the Crimea on September 30 to join in the talks.

While the precise course of these discussions is not known, it was significant that Hungary, like Poland but unlike all the other satellites, continued to destalinize and desovietize. On October 6 Rajk was disinterred and given a public funeral with honors, while an estimated 200,000 Hungarians marched beside his coffin. Imre Nagy ("the Hungarian Malenkov," premier from July 1953 to April 1955) who himself had been expelled from the party as a "Titoist" in January 1956, publicly embraced "Rajkism" by kissing Rajk's widow. On October 10 a broadcast by Budapest praised Tito for his fight against "Stalinist tyranny." On October 13, Nagy was reinstated in the party. On the same day the regime announced the arrest of Mihaly Farkas, the former Minister of Defense and secret police chief under Rakosi, who had been expelled from the party a few days after the latter's fall. On October 20, 3,000 students of the University of Szeged broke with the Communist youth organization. On the same day the party organ *Szabad Nep* itself declared the need for a "Hungarian way to socialism." Nagy was restored to the Academy of Sciences. Budapest Radio "welcomed" the readmission of Gomulka to the Polish Central Committee, and praised the fact that the Polish Communists "are not afraid to draw the absolutely necessary consequences" of their march forward.

On October 21 the students of the universities of Szeged, Pecs, and the Budapest University of Technology formulated "demands" for greater personal and national freedom. By the next day, the demands were more precise and were being circulated among the population. In Gyor, popular demonstrations called for the release of Cardinal Mindszenty and, more significantly, for the withdrawal from Hungary of all Soviet troops. This new demand for complete Soviet withdrawal was issued simultaneously in Budapest by crowds also calling for the return of Nagy. Radio Budapest itself philosophized on Hungary's following the example of Poland, which had just witnessed Wladyslaw Gomulka's successful

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bid to set an "independent" Communist course. At this juncture Geroe, Premier Andras Hegedus, and party Secretary Janos Kadar returned from a week's visit to Belgrade.

On Tuesday, October 23, the Ministry of the Interior formally lifted the ban on public assembly under pressure of the student demonstrators. The demonstrations, without interference by the uniformed police, became more vociferous in repeating demands for withdrawal of Soviet troops and reinstatement of Nagy. Only after the AVH (secret police) opened fire on unarmed crowds, reportedly including Hungarian army officers, did the demonstrations in Budapest become violent and uncontrollable riots. Individual soldiers and officers joined the demonstrators.

From Armed Conflict to Revolution

THUS it was that the Hungarian search for greater freedom led to armed conflict. The Hungarian Central Committee met in an all-night session the night of October 23-24. The first major, and fateful, decision was reached: Geroe called Moscow, apparently painted a picture of disastrous rioting and imminent danger, and asked for Soviet military assistance. Based upon this report of the situation, the Soviet leaders sent orders to the Russian forces in Hungary. Hegedus then resigned and Nagy was named premier, primarily as a move to soothe the populace. By then it was the morning of October 24. Hungarian Army forces, with some Soviet troops, were sent to suppress the demonstrators. But some, perhaps many, Hungarian army units went over to the insurgents, and others stood "neutral." The only program of the Hungarian regime was an appeal to the insurgents to lay down their arms, promising amnesty but threatening those who would not surrender. In the absence of firm leadership and authority, riot turned to rebellion. Nagy was at this time a virtual prisoner, reportedly even broadcasting at pistol-point under AVH orders.[1] The crowds called for Geroe to go.

The second major development occurred on Thursday, October 25, when Soviet chiefs Mikoyan and Suslov flew into Budapest, ousted Geroe as party boss, and acceded to Nagy's assumption of the premiership in fact as well as in name. An account of the precise circumstances surrounding these moves was later furnished to a Western correspondent by a high Hungarian official reportedly present at the meeting of Mikoyan and Suslov with Geroe; though the account cannot by its nature be verified, its interesting details accord with the steps taken on that day.[2] According to the source, Mikoyan and Suslov flew into a rage at Geroe; Mikoyan berated him for having "stampeded" Moscow into an ill-advised commitment of Soviet troops through his "exaggerated and distorted" picture of the situation. Suslov followed up with the "suggestion" that Geroe resign at once. When Geroe protested, citing Moscow's earlier position that he was needed to hold the party together, Mikoyan reportedly replied angrily, "the party already has fallen apart, thanks to your incredible blunders." The Soviet leaders then summoned Janos Kadar, purged under Rakosi and Geroe, and informed him that he would succeed Geroe as First Secretary of the party. The now unuseful Geroe was taken away in protective custody. Next, Mikoyan and Suslov agreed that Nagy should announce a series of "concessions," in particular promising withdrawal of Soviet troops *from the city* of Budapest and a review of Soviet-Hungarian treaties. By then the rebellion had become nationwide revolt.

Victory—or Respite?

ON Friday, October 26, Nagy publicly recognized the justice of some of the insurgents' demands. He attributed the conditions leading to these demands to "mistakes and crimes" of the last ten years. Finally, he promised eventual complete Soviet military withdrawal from Hungary. Appeals for cease-fire and surrender continued. By this time the major part of the Hungarian Army was evidently either neutral or on the side of the insurgents.

A new coalition government was formed and made public on October 27, including the non-Communist leaders Zolta Tildy and Bela Kovacs, serving respectively as Minister of State Affairs and Minister of Agriculture. The next day, Sunday the 28th, Radio Budapest announced to the rebels: "You have won!" Nagy reiterated that he would seek complete withdrawal from Hungary of Soviet troops (now no longer "eventual" withdrawal). A "new" army and police were recognized. The Kossuth coat of arms was officially sanctioned to replace the Communist ear of corn on the flag and the red star on uniforms. On Monday, October 29, the AVH (secret police) was abolished, and the Soviets began to withdraw from Budapest as requested. But even complete withdrawal from Budapest was tied to a rebel cease-fire.

After one week of popular uprising—from nonviolent demonstration to national revolt—the revolution

[1] This revelation was made over Radio Budapest on October 31 in a declaration of the instrumental Revolutionary Committee of University Youth.

[2] The official who revealed these details was not identified by name, presumably for security reasons; see Leslie Balogh Bain, "Witness Tells How Soviet Dictated to Budapest Reds," *The Evening Star,* Washington, D.C., October 31, 1956, p. A-18.

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was virtually consummated. On Tuesday, the 30th, Nagy announced that free elections, with all the parties of 1945, would be held. He publicly cleared his own record by declaring that he had not approved the call for intervention of Soviet troops, and demanded their immediate withdrawal from Budapest. This withdrawal began on a substantial scale in the afternoon. Flushed with victory, the Hungarian Air Force Command published an "ultimatum" giving the Soviet troops twelve hours to leave Budapest or be attacked. Fighting died down everywhere.

Kremlin Reaction: Phase I

WHAT of the Soviet reaction to the week's events? As has been indicated, the Soviets realized that the use of Soviet troops had much aggravated the situation. On the 30th a remarkable statement was drafted by the Soviet government and released the next day. This statement hinted at a review of the policy of stationing Soviet troops in the satellites, implying their withdrawal from all countries save East Germany. The pronouncement (*Pravda,* October 31, 1956) included the following passage on the situation in Hungary:

> Since it considers that the further presence of Soviet army units in Hungary can serve as a cause for an even greater deterioration of the situation, the Soviet government has instructed its military command to withdraw Soviet Army units from Budapest. . . . [and] is ready to enter into negotiations with the Hungarian People's Republic and other participants of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary.

The very issuance of this statement clearly suggested a Soviet readiness to withdraw, once order had been re-established, and after due formalization by a joint decision of the Warsaw Pact members.

The Soviet press and radio had been cautious in reportage on events in Hungary. The reports of October 24 to 28 merely described the liquidation of a counter-revolutionary revolt by the Hungarians "with the assistance of units of the Soviet Army." The United States was said to have "fomented" the revolt. Each day it was said that the situation was now cleared up. On Sunday, the 28th, *Pravda* featured an article on "The Liquidation of a Counterrevolutionary Adventure in Hungary." But later on the 28th the fact that "workers' councils (Soviets)" had been set up was reported, and Nagy was cited on the "just demands" of the people. By Tuesday, October 30, Hungary's establishment of a "coalition of democratic parties" and the restoration of the Smallholders and Social Democratic parties were revealed. On Wednesday, October 31, the Soviet press and radio asserted that the rebellion was "not an uprising against socialism," that "Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Budapest," and that "life in the town has begun to revive." These are hardly the terms that would have been used to describe a situation in which Soviet troops were to intervene anew in force. By October 31, the Soviets had decided to make their peace with

BUDAPEST

(October 24, 1956)

A photograph taken soon after a crowd of Hungarian patriots destroyed the twenty-five foot high statue of Stalin in Budapest.

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the revolution. Soviet withdrawal from Budapest was by then virtually completed. The extent of the Hungarians' victory was evident with the appointment as First Deputy Defense Minister of Major Gen. Pal Maleter, a popular hero of the revolution who as a colonel had been one of the first to defect to the people's side with his men and tanks, and who led the defense of the Kilian Barracks against the Russians.

"Negotiations" and Preparations

ON October 31, however, a crucial event occurred in secret meetings of Nagy and Tildy with Mikoyan and Suslov, who reappeared in Budapest. Mikoyan and Suslov evidently had been dispatched to ascertain the situation, to subscribe to the new coalition government, but to stabilize it short of additional major concessions, especially relating to Soviet-Hungarian relations. Mikoyan offered to withdraw immediately from Hungary all Soviet troops above the contingents previously stationed under the Warsaw Pact agreement. Withdrawal of those stationed under the Pact provisions were to be negotiated by the pact powers. But Tildy *rejected* this offer and demanded withdrawal of all troops *at once;* moreover, he told Mikoyan that Hungary would definitely "repudiate the Warsaw Pact *in any case.*" [3] The Hungarians proposed a joint commission to discuss the Soviet withdrawal; the Soviets agreed. Mikoyan and Suslov departed.

Mikoyan and Suslov may have been empowered in advance to decide whether Soviet military intervention was necessary. But probably the Soviet leaders did not anticipate that the situation would entail such a decision —the government declaration of the previous day, Soviet military inaction, and Moscow home service reportage strongly suggest that they did not. But the shock of Tildy's statement on repudiation of the Warsaw Pact "in any case," and Nagy's and Tildy's insistence on immediate withdrawal reflecting their attitude of defiance, must have led Mikoyan and Suslov, either themselves or more likely in consultation with Moscow, to decide on the need for intervention. Early on the next morning (Thursday, November 1) Mikoyan and Suslov met with Kadar, and as will be shown, probably then laid the basis for a new, separate government to call for Soviet military intervention. They then returned to Moscow.

The Soviet decision on October 31 to intervene with force was doubtless a reluctant one. The great disadvantage to their entire newly-cultivated foreign policy of peaceful co-existence and anti-colonialism was obvious. But the imminent danger of a pro-Western, anti-Communist "neutral" Hungary bordering the Soviet Union itself was more than the Soviet leaders could tolerate. The danger of igniting the flames of revolt in the entire satellite empire was recognized as very great.

The decision to intervene and the consequences of intervention were serious setbacks to the liberalization of Soviet-satellite relations, but they do not necessarily indicate either general reversal to a "hard" Stalinist line or victory of the pro-Stalinist faction in the Soviet leadership. What they do indicate is that even the moderate faction agreed that Hungary had gone beyond permissible limits of self-assertion. The limits of permissibility had, in fact, been clearly stated earlier. Bulganin in Warsaw in July had said: "Every country should go its own way to socialism, but we cannot permit this to be used to break up the solidarity of the camp of peace [*i.e.,* the Soviet bloc]."[4]

The Soviet decision to intervene was doubtless facilitated although by no means determined by the diversion of world opinion to events in the Middle East. On October 30, the Anglo-French ultimatum had made clear the intention of those states to intervene with force in Egypt. Thus the Soviet leaders could be sure that the shock which the use of brutal force in Hungary would cause would be substantially mitigated throughout the world.

On Thursday, November 1, Nagy formally told Soviet Ambassador Andropov that Hungary was withdrawing immediately from the Warsaw Pact, declaring its neutrality, and seeking UN and Big Four guarantees of this neutrality. Later in the day this stand was publicy announced. Also on Thursday, Soviet troops began to surround Hungarian Air Force bases and occupied the Budapest airport ostensibly "to safeguard evacuation" of Soviet forces. Beginning on Thursday and continuing on Friday and Saturday, substantial additional Soviet forces moved into Hungary (raising the total from about five to fifteen divisions), sealed most of the Austrian border, and cut all the highways out of Budapest. Hungarian troops had previously been ordered by the government to "refrain from any hostile acts" toward the Soviet forces, and thus were powerless to prevent these so-called "peaceful" regroupings. [5]

Radio Moscow on Thursday continued to propagandize the Soviet declaration of Tuesday; it also noted the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest and reported the trip of Social Democrat Anna Kethly to Vienna to a

[3] This crucial fact was revealed by Major General Maleter in a broadcast interview on Radio Budapest November 2, in response to press inquiries as to what had occurred in the secret meetings of the Hungarian and Soviet leaders.

[4] As quoted on Radio Moscow, July 21, 1956.

[5] This was confirmed by Tildy in a press conference broadcast on Radio Budapest November 3.

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meeting of the Second International. But by November 2, the line was sharply revised to note "a new menacing stage" in Hungary.

On Saturday, November 3, Nagy announced an "encouraging start" in negotiations on withdrawal. But Tildy replied to a correspondent's question on Soviet guarantees not to initiate hostilities that: "The Soviet reply given so far was not satisfactory." [6] Major General Pal Maleter was named Minister of Defense, and he and the new Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Istvan Kovacs, began discussions at a secret meeting-place with the Soviet military delegation led by General of the Army Mikhail Malinin, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. [7]

Soviet Intervention and Immediate Aftermath

AT dawn (5:00 a.m.) on Sunday, November 4, Soviet forces launched a general offensive on Budapest and other Hungarian Army and Freedom Fighters' strongholds. The first word of the formation of a new "Hungarian Revolutionary Workers and Peasants" government was broadcast on a provincial radio at 4:00 a.m. by its new Minister of Armed Forces and Public Security, Ferenc Muennich (who had served in the Nagy cabinet until a few days earlier). Muennich revealed that the regime had been set up November 1 (presumably in secret and at the demand of Mikoyan and Suslov); this step, he explained, was necessitated by the fact that Nagy had become "impotent" under reactionary pressure. An hour later the new Kadar government program and appeal was broadcast, followed by a speech by Kadar. Moscow Radio broadcast Kadar's program, with its reference to an appeal for Soviet military assistance, that same morning. Radio Moscow also broadcast a *Pravda* editorial entitled "Chaos is Reigning in Hungary" (three days after assuring its audience that life had "returned to normal"!). Nagy was attacked for being "in direct connivance with reactionaries." Soviet troops were described as "assisting to curb the dire forces of reaction." The Hungarian Army and Air Force, effectively neutralized by the Soviet military reinforcement and deployment of November 1 to 4, had neither basis nor heart to resist. When the Soviet attack was launched, Nagy had been maneuvered into a position where he even had to call desperately over the radio for his Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff to "return to their posts"—and only then to ascertain that they were, of course, already Soviet prisoners at the "secret meeting place" for "negotiation." [8] Isolated army units and armed civilian insurgents fought on for ten heroic but hopeless days.

The Kadar Program: Promises under Pressure

HOWEVER brutal the Soviet suppression of the revolution the Kadar regime did not attempt to return to Geroe's position of October 15, much less to Stalinism and Rakosi. Kadar's initial statement, broadcast by the Balaton Szabadi provincial radio on November 4, declared:

> On October 23 *a mass movement* began in our country, whose *noble purpose* was to make good the anti-party and anti-national mistakes committed by Rakosi and his accomplices [elsewhere referred to as "the Rakosi-Geroe clique"] and to defend the national independence and sovereignty of Hungary (author's italics).

Kadar offered a full amnesty to the population and promised to improve living standards. Coalition popular-front government also was promised: "we shall definitely invite representatives of other parties" to assume ministries. He further asserted that after the restoration of order the regime would negotiate with the other Warsaw Pact states "on the question" of the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary; other broadcasts specifically promised negotiation "for withdrawal". At first, however, there was no mention of free elections and never has there been a hint of a withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact or neutrality.

In several speeches, Kadar has explained his alleged motives and those of his colleagues for leaving the Nagy regime, establishing a new government and requesting Soviet assistance. In a speech broadcast on November 11 he pinpointed the timing of the decision:

> It became clear as early [*sic*] as the middle of last week [Wednesday, October 31] that there were only two ways leading out of the grave situation. One way was to continue on the road to collapse which was followed by the Imre Nagy government . . . The alternative road was to stop the counter-revolutionary wave with every force, including

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Ibid.*; also reported in news broadcasts of that day which indicated that the discussions would continue that night.

[8] Nagy in a broadcast message on Radio Budapest the morning of November 4. The tactic of "arrest by invitation to negotiation" is a standard Communist tool. In the aftermath of the revolution (on December 11, 1956) the chairman of the Budapest Central Workers Council, Sandor Racz, and his deputy were arrested after accepting an invitation to confer with Kadar in the Parliament building (see E. Marton, Associated Press correspondent in Budapest, *The Evening Star*, December 13, 1956, and John McCormac, *The New York Times*, December 14, 1956). A similar and notorious instance of the postwar era took place in March 1945 when the 16 leaders of the Polish Underground Army were arrested and taken to the Lubianka Prison in Moscow after responding to an invitation in Marshal Zhukov's name to enter talks "in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and confidence" (See Z. Stypulkowski, *Invitation to Moscow*, Thames and Hudson, London, 1951, p. 211).

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the help of Soviet forces . . . [or, as he put it a few days later, "*even* with the help of the Soviet Army"].

In this and several other speeches, Kadar also has reiterated that:

. . . after order has been restored, we should start negotiations with member states of the Warsaw Pact concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory. Only in this way is it possible . . . to assure our complete national independence and sovereignty.

The official organ *Nepszabadzag* has since continued to stress the need for Soviet withdrawal. Thus on November 18:

If anyone tries to prevent the bringing about of Hungarian independence, he will find himself confronted with the resistance of an entire united nation. Against a resistance of this kind, 10,000 tanks and masses of guns and airplanes would be of no use. The Hungarian people's desire for independence is so great now that there exists no force which could quell it.

On November 15, a delegation of workers inquired of Kadar why Soviet troops did not leave Hungary. Kadar made the astonishing reply that his government wanted them to leave but that the Russians *declined to do so* until order was restored. Moreover, he went beyond his initial program and also declared (as reported the same day on Radio Budapest): "We want a multiparty system and free honest elections," with all parties participating which "stand for socialist principles and serve the interests of the workers." He even said that "Nagy never has been an enemy of our system, and I see no reason why he should not resume a position in public life." By contrast, on the same day, Geroe, Hegedus, Colonel General Istvan Bata ("the Rokossovsky of Hungary," a long-time Soviet officer of Hungarian origin, and recently Hungarian Defense Minister) and other Stalinists were barred "forever" from public and party activity.

Kadar—Traitor or Puppet?

IN short, the Kadar regime, over a period of a few weeks, paid lip service to all of the major measures of the Nagy government through October 30. Can these promises be believed? The question even now cannot be answered with assurance. There is no doubt at all that many of the official statements issuing from the regime were prompted out of desperation over the continuing heroic resistance of the population through strike actions and other protest measures. On the other hand, the possibility that some of these promises eventually will be honored cannot be written off entirely. Indignation at the Soviet intervention and brutal butchering of the Hungarian population should not lead us to view the revolution as a complete failure or to foresee a return to rigid "Stalinism".

It seems significant that as early as November 12, Mikoyan and Suslov (possibly with Khrushchev) returned to Budapest and that immediately thereafter Kadar attempted, although unsuccessfully, to enter into talks with Imre Nagy seeking to enlist his aid in a new, more popular government. [9] It would appear that Kadar, and at least part of the Soviet leadership, expected the carefully prepared and massive Soviet intervention of November 4 to stun the nation and stamp out all resistance very quickly, and to permit a show of "magnanimity in victory" by Kadar. The ten days of resistance and the continuing general strike made this course impossible.

Whether the present or a post-Kadar government will shift to become more "pro-Soviet" or more "independent" is at this point unclear. But it *may* still be the latter: a Soviet-permitted "Titoist" but definitely Communist government. Kadar's program attempted to create the basis for this, although Kadar has branded himself a Russian puppet by conspiring and justifying the Soviet intervention and by permitting himself to be a "front" for Soviet deportations, revenge repressions, and military occupation. The strength of the revolution will surely impress the Soviets with the need either to maintain occupation or conceivably (although improbably) to reverse their decision on intervention by permitting a "new Nagy", or even Nagy himself, to assume power.

Kadar himself may even aspire to be a genuine Gomulka (one may project the parallel in reverse—Gomulka might well be a Kadar if a non-Communist regime permitted anti-Communist "terror"). This assumption of his "independent Communist" inclination is supported to some extent by the attitude of Tito, who knows the formerly imprisoned "Titoist" Kadar—and the Soviet leaders—well. Tito has recognized the Kadar government, while assailing the Soviet intervention; indeed in his speech at Pula on November 11 he listed the Hungarian party under Kadar, along with his own and the Polish parties, as representing a "liberal" trend in contradistinction to those of Moscow and the other satellites. [10]

Yet even assuming that Kadar is so inclined, can he, for example, obtain Soviet withdrawal of all troops from Hungary once order is fully re-established? And, finally, is Kadar master even in the Hungarian government? The *eminence grise* is the Deputy Premier, Dr. Ferenc Muennich, Minister of the Armed Forces and Public

[9] Elie Abel, "Hungarian Chief Seeks Nagy's Aid," *The New York Times,* November 12, 1956.

[10] Tito's speech at Pula, November 11, broadcast over Radio Belgrade November 15 and reprinted in a translated excerpt in *The New York Times* November 17.

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Security (the police). Muennich it was who first announced the new government, early on November 4. On November 12, Muennich stated in a broadcast interview with Czech correspondents that "immediately during the first days of the events [sic] in Hungary the initiative was taken by Horthy officers who came from abroad and activated the forces of reaction inside the country"—a far cry from Kadar's official statement that "on October 23 a mass movement [with] noble purpose began in our country. . . ." Muennich was reportedly overheard (by a Hungarian political figure who subsequently escaped to Austria) to have called Kadar an "idiot" who is "misleading the nation"—this in Kadar's presence as the latter was reading a statement over the radio to the people. [11] In his duties, aside from such exceptional tasks as assisting the Soviet secret police to abduct Imre Nagy when the latter left the Yugoslav embassy, Muennich has been attempting to rebuild Hungarian military and police forces. He has announced that "a new army would be organized on an entirely new basis", indicating vaguely that "a majority" of those officers and soldiers proved to be reliable will form its core. "We want," he said, "an army *and security organs* that will . . . protect the socialist and revolutionary achievements of the Hungarian people." [12] On November 15 all Hungarian officers were required to sign a pledge of loyalty to the Kadar government *and* of approval of the Soviet intervention.

The Price of Compromise

KADAR'S motivation for supporting the Soviet intervention of November 4 was apparently based on the following two considerations: (1) the anti-Communist terror was annihilating "good" (Kadar-like) Communists, not only Stalinists and AVH, and therefore must be stopped; and (2) the Soviets were going to intervene whether he, Kadar, agreed to form a government and to support them or not; hence he should step in to do what was possible to rescue Hungarian national communism, rather than see the Soviets pick a Geroe or a Muennich. Later, and continuing today, Kadar is in the helpless position of being both compromised at home for sanctioning the Soviet intervention, and helpless in dealing with the Soviets because he has no support at home. He probably considers that he has no choice but to stay on, try to restore order, and mitigate Soviet repression and internal reaction where possible.

[11] See *The Sunday Star,* Washington, D.C., November 25, 1956, for the Associated Press report of this incident.

[12] These statements were made in the course of an interview with Czech correspondents, broadcast the same day (November 12) over Radio Prague, and published in *Pravda* of November 14.



A COMMON SIGHT OF THE REVOLUTION

This sign on a store window in Budapest reads "Russians, go home!"

But Kadar's only support is Tito, and this appears to be of little avail; moreover, Tito has partially withdrawn his support since Kadar's impotent acquiescence in the Soviet abduction of Nagy [13] and in the dissolution of the Workers' Councils.[14]

Kadar's motives may deserve sympathy, but Kadar the impotent premier does not. His betrayal of Nagy and endorsement of the brutal Soviet intervention, no matter how rationalized, has had the effect of justifying and assisting the Soviet-imposed counterrevolution. He may still *wish* to preserve the fruits of the early phase of the revolution, but in fact he has been unable to do so. Torn between Soviet as well as local Communist pressure on one hand, and popular Hungarian pressure on the other, he has succumbed to the former. And whatever the long-range Soviet policy may prove to be, Moscow's immediate reaction has been to submerge the revolution in a wave of repression and reaction, thus far making empty farces of Kadar's promises of greater freedom.

The basic cause of the failure of "Kadarism"—both in the Nagy period and since Kadar's own assumption of nominal authority—is that the Hungarian people did not and do not want "national communism" or "Tito-

[13] A Polish radio commentator has boldly remarked (November 25, Home Service) that Nagy and his group "were abducted by Soviet authorities, contrary to the agreement between the government of Yugoslavia and the Kadar government. This incident proves also the helplessness of the Kadar government in the face of the Soviet decisions enforced on the government, perhaps against its will."

[14] The Workers' Councils (especially the Budapest Central Council) were the only really popular representative organs. They were outlawed on December 9 (see Radio Budapest and *Nepszabadzag* of December 9). The Yugoslav press and radio (see especially December 10) strongly criticized the outlawing of the councils.

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ism." They want not an imposed popular front but genuinely free elections and parliamentary government. They want not local Hungarian autonomy in the so-called "socialist camp", but real national freedom and neutrality.

There is a possibility that Nagy himself, and a few of his collaborators (Losonczy and Lukacs in particular), did come to realize this fact, and concluded that national communism must work for its program only by persuasion, even if that meant abdicating power in free elections. If this was indeed Nagy's attitude it marks the first time in history that a Communist leader had enough faith in his beliefs to be willing to risk their free competition with other ideas. No wonder Tito supported Kadar; Nagy was no longer a "Titoist," he had apparently become a "Djilasist." [15] Thus the dilemma of "national communism" ultimately led Nagy to choose the path of national freedom, and Kadar to choose Soviet tanks and secret police.

The Prospects for Eastern Europe

IN retrospect, it would seem clear that the tragedy of the Hungarian revolution was its inability to stand on the achievements of October 30. By precipitously withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, it threatened (in Soviet eyes) to place a Western base on the very borders of the Soviet Union and to dynamite the entire satellite empire. In the author's view, the actions of Nagy and Tildy on October 31—under the tremendous pressure of the populace and the provincial "revolutionary councils" (especially at Gyor)—were the main factor leading the Soviets to intervene.

If the above analysis is correct, the timing of the Soviet decision to intervene would seem to indicate that there was—prior to October 31—a Soviet readiness to permit, under pressure, a substantial departure from traditional satellite status *without* intervention. If Nagy had held to the gains of October 30 and been able to restore order, as seems possible albeit not certain, the Soviets might have withdrawn their forces from Hungary (and possibly Rumania and even Poland) in the relatively near future. Nagy, becoming more Titoist than Tito, might have been permitted to exercise the substantial dgree of independence implied by that position. It is also quite possible that Hungary might have evolved toward a neutral position after the Soviet withdrawal, without thereby prompting a new Soviet invasion.

Again, if the Hungarians had not pushed so far as to precipitate Soviet intervention, the "moderate" view in the Moscow Presidium would have been able to say more convincingly that it is necessary *and possible* to loosen the grip on the satellites in order to avoid the risk of an explosion. Instead, the "hard" view can now affirm that any relaxation of control will lead to an explosion which can only be suppressed at great loss in international prestige, and must therefore be avoided.

This, however, does not mean that a "hard" policy has been settled upon. Khrushchev may have so alienated himself from the "hard-line" Stalinists (Molotov, Kaganovich, Suslov) by his policies of partial relaxation and his embrace of Tito that he will have no choice but to seek to continue (with Bulganin) hewing to a line supported by the "moderates", presumably led by Mikoyan and Malenkov. A real reversal would imply his responsibility for the errors leading to Poznan and Gomulka, Budapest and Nagy. And the adherents of a liberalized relationship with the satellites may still say (as Tito does) that the real cause of the Hungarian affair was not relaxation of controls but the delay in relaxing them. Moreover, the armed intervention in Hungary may be judged sufficient warning to other satellites of the allowable limits of "independence."

A major factor of uncertainty in estimates of future Soviet policy is the attitude of the Army leaders. Zhukov and Konev presumably had agreed to a withdrawal of Soviet forces from the satellites (except East Germany) *if* stable governments in Poland, Rumania, and Hungary (such as the ones in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria) could be assured, and *if* the integrity of the Warsaw Pact could be retained. These conditions of reliability are now certainly far from assured. At the least it can be expected that both political and military leaders believe the USSR's military security requires continuance of the Warsaw Pact.

* * *

This, then, was the tragedy of Hungary—an "October Revolution" crushed on the eve of the thirty-ninth anniversary of the Soviet October Revolution. The specter of another tragedy, a possible general Soviet policy of repression to preclude future Hungaries, is present. But there is also inspiration to be found in the courageous action of the Hungarian revolution, and in the refusal of the nation to accept the counterrevolution imposed by Soviet steel. The tragedy of revolution won and lost in a day is not the finale; it may well be only the prelude to disintegration of the Soviet colonial satellite empire.

[15] Milovan Djilas himself, commenting on the Hungarian tragedy in similar terms for the *New Leader* (New York, November 19, 1956), incurred the wrath of his ex-colleague, Tito, and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for his audacity (Radio Belgrade, December 12, 1956).

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Ideology and Power:

Crisis in the Soviet Bloc

By ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

IN 1953 the Soviet bloc was characterized by ideological unity and dictatorial centralization of power. Today, Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe is at stake. And whatever happens between the Elbe and the Bug rivers, between the Baltic and the Adriatic seas, is likely to have grave consequences not only for the USSR as a world power but also for internal Soviet life. The intricate relationship between ideology and power, built up over many years by Stalin, has been dissipated by his successors.

Stalin's death deprived the Soviet system and its peripheral satellites not only of strong leadership but also—and in the long run more important—of the elements of fear and unity of purpose, all component parts of the Stalinist system. It was this system which gave the bloc a coherent frame of reference, and local leadership could in a sense anticipate Moscow reactions by basing itself on the fundamental tenets of Stalinism. The result was fawning imitation of Soviet patterns of development and the application of Stalinist methods to local circumstances. Stalin's death did not provoke an immediate abandonment of Stalinism but led rather to a stage of experimentation in the USSR, and consequently also in the peripheries. New solutions to domestic and external problems had to be tested. The death of the dictator left a certain gap, and as a result the succession leadership badly needed some common basis as a point of reference for its decision making. Under these circumstances ideology became more important than it had been for some time.

Disintegration of Ideology and Power

EFFORTS to cope with existing problems were further complicated by a struggle for power in the top ranks of the Moscow leadership. A crucial by-product of that struggle, important not only for the USSR but above all else for later developments in Eastern Europe, was the weakening of the police apparatus. Since the satellite police networks in the past had been directly tied to the Moscow MVD, the decline of police power caused considerable dislocation and, as is now apparent, also demoralization in the local police establishments. A significant instrument of control was thus lessened and the factor of fear lost its potency.

One of the crucial international issues which faced the succession leadership was the problem of Soviet-satellite relations. This necessarily involved the Yugoslav question. Feeling apparently that Stalin's reaction to Tito was largely a product of the late dictator's pathological hatreds and phobias (see Khrushchev's secret speech), and that domestically Tito was a good Stalinist (a fact certainly true in 1948), some Soviet leaders were inclined to think that the Soviet bloc would be strengthened by a *rapprochement* with Tito and that international communism would thereby gain increased prestige. It appears further that among the Soviet leaders only Molotov fully understood the disruptive implications of Titoism and warned early in 1955 against this policy, suggesting that while Tito may have been in fact a real Stalinist in the past, a policy of apologia would have unsettling consequences elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. Khrushchev's and Mikoyan's arguments, however, carried the day and the famous B-K trip to Belgrade followed in the summer of 1955.

The Soviet leadership, it seems, assumed that Tito was basically still the same dictator he had been in 1948, and that by meeting his demands for local authority a pattern would be established for similarly firm Communist regimes elsewhere. That their assumption was not too far-fetched is suggested by the paradoxical fact that it was not Tito but rather Stalin and Molotov who first appreciated the implications of "Titoism" as a competitive system of "socialism." Tito's position developed slowly. At first it was merely a cry of outrage of a local Stalinist leader against the Stalinist system which could not tolerate little Stalins. Gradually, through

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internal reforms, policy statements and new clashes with Stalin, a more coherent Titoist line began to emerge. By 1955, however, it was still not a coherent ideology ready for export to supplant Stalinism as the frame of reference for the Soviet bloc.[1]

The Soviet leaders, quite understandably, wanted to reach the broadest ideological cooperation with Tito, believing that this would strengthen their ties with the satellites. This aim was in keeping with their assessments. But Tito, gradually emerging with a theoretical framework of his own, succeeded in June 1955 in holding out for a limited state agreement. He thereby preserved his own ideological independence while still not attempting to export his own position. Stalinism as the frame of reference was still the official if somewhat tarnished doctrine of the Soviet bloc. It was only after Khrushchev's attack on Stalin at the Twentieth CPSU Congress (the motives for which are outside the scope of this paper) and the Kremlin's concomitant lip-service to the concept of "separate paths to socialism," that Stalinism was finally shattered and Titoism emerged as a full fledged theory, ready to fill the resulting vacuum.

The June 1956 joint declaration of the CPSU and the League of Yugoslav Communists meant to Tito the acceptance of the principle

> . . . that the roads and conditions of socialist development are different in different countries, that the wealth of the forms of socialist development contributes to their strengthening, and . . . that any tendency to impose one's own views in determining the roads and forms of socialist development are alien to both sides. . . .[2]

Curiously, it now appears that even then Khrushchev and others (with the known exception of Molotov) still did not quite realize that their signatures meant in fact giving their blessing to Titoism as the new theoretical statement of the norms for Soviet-satellite relations. Tito was no longer a local Communist dictator, imitations of whom could be set up elsewhere and controlled by Moscow, thereby strengthening the unity of the Soviet bloc. Tito was now attempting to project his concepts into an overall principle of a multifold pattern of Communist development in Communist states, even in the USSR. The June 1956 declaration opened the way for him, and in 1956 Tito was ideologically and politically prepared to step forward.

This ideological upheaval was paralleled in 1956 by the increasingly apparent disintegration of Soviet control in Poland and Hungary. Years of forced industrialization on the Soviet model had produced widespread poverty in the satellites, serving as a catalyst for mass disillusionment. This, coupled with Stalinist police terror, had alienated the intellectuals: by 1955 they gradually began to speak out in criticism of the existing state of affairs. In both Poland and Hungary it was the intellectuals who spearheaded the growing ferment, and in both countries Communist writers were among those in the first ranks of disaffected critics. In Poland Wazyk with his "Poem for Adults" and Kott with his attacks on socialist realism matched people like Hay and Dery in Hungary.[3] The neutralization and subsequent demoralization of the police apparatus made administrative repression difficult, while the broad support that these people enjoyed among the masses made less violent measures ineffective.

The impact of the intellectuals on the Polish and Hungarian populations (particularly the youth) was enhanced by the fact that they enjoyed an almost complete monopoly of the press, to which they had previously gained access as apologists for the regimes. Furthermore, in both countries the intellectuals traditionally had played a significant political role, formulating and proclaiming national ideals at such times when these countries lacked statesmen or military leaders and were under foreign domination.

The growing protests of the intellectuals over recent months not only influenced the masses but also produced gradual demoralization among the local ruling cadres of the party. An important reason for this was the disproportionately large size of the Communist (Workers') parties in both Poland and Hungary as compared to the more tightly knit party apparatus of he USSR or Yugoslavia.[4] It came as no surprise that under these circumstances the Communist hard core found itself outnumbered even within the party itself.

Stalinist efforts to counterattack in Poland were made difficult not only by the weakness of the ruling group once the police power disappeared but also by the fortuitous circumstances of Bierut's death. This removed from the scene an able organizer and an established ruler. His successors were forced to manipulate rather than to act brutally, while at the same time they were probably unwilling to reveal their internal weakness by calling on Moscow for help. In Hungary, Rakosi's belated moves against the writers in the summer of 1956 were rendered

[1] For a description of some aspects of Titoist ideology, see "Is Russia Going Titoist?" by E. Halperin, *Problems of Communism,* No. 5 (September-October), 1956.

[2] As translated in *The New York Times,* June 21, 1956, p. 10.

[3] See "Minds in Revolt"—reports on intellectual ferment in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, respectively by Czeslaw Milosz, Ferenc Kormendi, and Stephan Marinoff in *Problems of Communism,* No. 3 (May-June), 1956.

[4] In Hungary, 900,000 out of a population of 9 million; in Poland, 1,300,000 out of 27 million; in Yuogslavia; 650,000 out of 17 million; in the USSR (after 40 years), 7,000,000 out of over 200 million.

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harmless by the outside pressure of Tito, whom the Soviet leadership was willing to accommodate (and also by the Rajk scandal). The June 1956 Tito-Khrushchev declaration, furthermore, gave this ferment a certain ideological content which the Stalinist faction lacked. The latter responded, as in Poland, without firm ideological formulations and was finally reduced to slogans such as "the press and the race are responsible for the present evils", a crude appeal to anti-intellectualism and anti-semitism.

The Soviet Reaction and Policy Alternatives

SOVIET recognition of the gravity of the situation appears to have been belated. In the fall of 1956 a secret circular letter was sent out to the various satellite capitals, allegedly warning against the pitfalls of the Yugoslav experience. The time when a mere Moscow letter could turn the clock back had clearly passed, however. The subsequent rushed flight of the Soviet leaders to Warsaw in October suggests that they had underestimated the gravity of the situation, and that their local stooges possibly had misled them for the sake of their own local interests.

The recent events in Poland and Hungary need no reciting. What might be pointed out again, however, is that Soviet action in Poland and Hungary was one of accommodation to the unfolding situation, with some pattern of hesitation and uncertainty in the Hungarian case. Moscow's reaction in the latter case need not be viewed as inconsistent with its line toward Poland since the revolution in Hungary went so much farther. But what is surprising is the somewhat confused nature of that reaction, ranging from halfhearted intervention, to withdrawal, to brutal repression. Partially, this can be explained in logistical terms. But a further reason is suggested by Tito's Pula speech in mid-November and an article in the Italian Communist organ *L'Unitá* of November 25th. It appears from these presumably well-informed sources that the Soviet leadership is itself uncertain and split on what further policies to adopt in Eastern Europe. Having belatedly appreciated both the disintegrative consequences of the ideological vacuum created by the destruction of established doctrine, and the weakness of the local regimes once the police terror decreased, the leadership now has to reassess the entire situation.

The alternatives open to it are basically twofold:

The first is to use force on a large scale to reestablish firm Soviet control in Eastern Europe and to cow any future Gomulka-ists. The difficulty with this proposition, apart from the increased danger of war, is that such a policy is probably impossible unless accompanied by a reversion to Stalinism in the USSR itself. The latter would involve considerable resort to force, as the "non-Stalinist" faction (using the term loosely) probably enjoys more widespread support than the "hard-policy" group. For this reason the liquidation of the "non-Stalinists" would become necessary if the alternative policy were to prevail. The unanswerable question at this stage is whether the capacity for the reintroduction of fullfledged terror still exists in Moscow. Other possible consequences also would have to be weighed—namely, the weakening effect on world communism, an increase of tensions between Moscow and Peiping, and continuing loss of support in Asia once the policy of brutality were adopted on a large scale.

Moscow's second alternative is to tolerate and manipulate the present trends in Eastern Europe, using force only when they become excessive, hoping eventually to contain them, and counting at the same time on the continued development of revolutionary trends in other parts of the world. The use of violence in Hungary can still be compatible with this policy. Eventually, it may be hoped in Moscow, Gomulka will fall victim to internal difficulties and the situation will adjust itself. If not, there is always time to adopt the first alternative.

Whichever solution is finally adopted, the monolithic unity of the Soviet bloc has ceased to exist. What in the spring of 1956 Togliatti called "polycentrism" is rapidly becoming, despite Moscow's intentions, a political fact in Eastern Europe. And this fact will not be easy to change. Return to a policy of Stalinism, even if practicable, probably would mean large-scale bloodshed, war, and the further splintering of world communism, including the alienation of China, even though in Eastern Europe it could temporarily lead to a reassertion of Soviet control. But the adoption of the second solution, which the Soviet leadership—barring some unforeseen explosion—apparently has decided to pursue for the time being, also results in the continued splintering of ideological unity and power in the Soviet bloc. Furthermore, the longer the present policy is pursued, with the consequent weakening of Stalinist positions of strength at home and abroad, the more difficult it will be to abandon the present policy in favor of the first alternative.

Community of Hostile Communisms

SEVERAL concepts of socialism, of the methods of achieving it, and of the relations between socialist states already are in competition with each other in Eastern Europe. The Soviet concept, gradually emerging after the destruction of Stalinism and the disappointing experience wih Tito, has been stated most clearly in the Suslov speech of November 6, and in the *Pravda* reply of November 23 to Tito's speech at Pula a few

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days earlier. The Soviet position is much clearer on what the leadership wishes to avoid than on what it wishes to establish (thereby testifying again to a certain disunity). The Soviet leaders deny strongly that Stalinism must be combatted through major reforms in the system itself; they also continue to emphasize the preeminent role of Soviet experience although conceding the relevance of local circumstances. The emphasis is still on one-party dictatorship and control from above. They also justify the Soviet military intervention in Hungary as a necessity in view of the "reactionary counterrevolution" which Nagy was not able to control. In this they are supported by the political leadership of East Germany, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania (there Nagy has been called a "counterrevolutionary bandit"), and also that of Thorez in France. In fact, it is likely that the satellite leaders are putting pressure on Moscow to hold the line against further concessions.

O Ž I V L J A V A N J E



REVIVAL

—Look out, that one is raising his head . . .

—From *Oslobodjenje* (Sarajevo) November 18, 1956.

The intermediary position is held by Tito who, while advocating the complete independence of "socialist states" and the development of socialism along local lines, and denying that there is any need to follow the Soviet example, at the same time insists on the primary role of the Communist Party and will brook no internal opposition. Tito's position, in its broad outline, is supported by Togliatti who specifically stated (*L'Unitá,* November 29), "I feel that the formula of 'a guiding party' is obsolete." While the Stalinist features which characterized Tito's Yugoslavia up to about 1950 far more than elsewhere in East Europe have been modified significantly, nonetheless the scope of internal freedom is more limited than in Poland. On the Hungarian issue Tito has gone on record as recognizing with regret the necessity of the second Soviet intervention. Tito's stand in some respects corresponds, it would appear, to the Chinese position. The Chinese Communists recently condemned "big power chauvinism" and have given tacit support to the Poles, but their internal system has not undergone any major changes and is still largely Stalinist. Chou's forthcoming visit to the USSR and Eastern Europe probably will attempt to maintain "the achievements of destalinization" but also will strive to restrain any further moves either by Moscow or Tito or the Poles which could widen the existing breach. This was probably the purpose of the Chinese Communists' pre-New Year statement warning against excessive attacks on Stalinism.

The extreme position is held by Gomulka. While insisting on the same external privileges that Tito gained, internally his concessions have gone much further. The press is relatively free and outspoken, the jamming of foreign broadcasts has ended, books by Polish emigrés are being published, Polish sailors can now work on foreign ships, trade unions are being democratized, compulsion in agriculture is being abandoned, large-scale rehabilitation of political victims has been undertaken, the Church has regained its authority in internal matters, the Communist youth organization, patterned on the Komsomol, has broken up, *etc.* All of this, of course, is at least partially the result of his difficult internal situation since, unlike Tito, Gomulka has to depend for his support on the masses and not on a militant party backed by the police. Nonetheless, even ideologically Gomulka has veered far from the Soviet position in defining socialism as meaning essentially the elimination of exploitation of man by man. This ideal, according to Gomulka, can be achieved in all sorts of ways by all sorts of people, including even Catholics: "Impoverished is the thought that socialism can be built only by people with materialist viewpoints".[5] The Moscow agreement of November 19th between Gomulka and Khrushchev, however, did not go as far in giving the Poles ideological equality and the right to mutual criticism as did the analogous agreement with Tito. This suggests again that Moscow is attempting to contain Gomulka, hoping for his internal collapse but shrinking from the use of force for the time being. Yet even in Moscow the Poles refrained from endorsing either of the two Soviet inter-

[5] *Nowe Drogi* report of the Eighth Plenum of the PZPR, No. 10 (88), 1956. pp. 36, 38. (The specific quote is from 36 but the point is again developed on p. 38.)

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

Title Caption: New Version of Man's Tragedy
Caption Below: Adam, don't jump—you've been rehabilitated!

—From *Ludas Matyi* (Budapest), October 11, 1956.

ventions in Hungary, while their press has openly espoused the Hungarian cause. [6]

Today we are witnessing in Eastern Europe a dialogue among Communist parties such as has never been heard before. States which recognize each other as "socialist" are at the same time accusing one another, often in intemperate terms, of a variety of ideological offenses. The Poles and Yugoslavs have gone far in suggesting that the Soviet system is itself responsible for Stalin's excesses. The East Germans have defended Stalinism, have denied Polish claims that a "second revolution" has occurred in Poland, and have stated that Polish outbursts against Stalinism place their authors "in the company of counterrevolution". The Poles have countered by stating that East German Stalinists are afraid of socialism. French Communist leaders have backed the East Germans and have attacked Gomulka. The Czechs have criticized the Yugoslavs. The Soviets have held up the Czechs and the East Germans as an example for other Communist parties to emulate and have condemned Polish statements that relations between Communist parties ought to be based on the principle of "coexistence." (e.g., see *Pravda,* December 23, 1956, pp. 3-4). The Yugoslavs have clashed publicly with the USSR (the Nagy abduction being a major irritation symptomatic of general strain), while their relations with Albania have degenerated to the level of mutual namecalling. In his Pula speech Tito referred to Enver Hoxha in contemptuous terms; in reply *Zeri i Popullit,* the organ of the Albanian party, published a long attack on Tito, referring to him throughout as "Josip Broz-Tito" without the usual prefix "comrade."[7] Putting Tito's Marxism to doubt, the paper alluded to Tito's statements as "anti-Soviet lies," suggesting that they were made for the benefit of the "imperialists". The paper also quoted with approval Suslov's statement that "all the countries which have entered the road of socialist development are generally using the main principles drafted during our revolution and applied in life during the development of the Soviet Union". The Yugoslavs also have clashed with the French and have suggested that the logic of the French defense of Stalin should lead the French CP to a full rehabilitation of Beria.

This dialogue is significant and it is likely to get even louder. In the past all such discussion was synchronized in Moscow and its tone set by an authoritative outburst

[6] Symptomatic of this was their handling of the Nagy kidnapping. Dismissing the Soviet version altogether, they referred to it as a "Soviet abduction" which shows the helplessness of the Kadar regime and possibly was even performed against its will.

[7] *Zeri i Popullit,* Tirana, November 23, 1956.

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from the center. Some interpreters have been inclined to interpret the present exchanges as being similarly directed by Moscow. However, their uneven pattern and the marked variations in their tone and content suggests that local Stalinist leaders are attempting to force Moscow's hand and push it in a direction more in keeping with their own local vested interests. This again is significant if compared to the monolithic pattern of the past. The defense of Stalinism is no longer primarily in Soviet hands.

Implications for the Future

FUTURE developments depend in great measure on what happens in Poland. The Hungarians' tragic struggle, so moving in its courage that it already has earned a lasting place in history, has resulted in a great political defeat for the USSR. It has finally buried the dream of Khrushchevism: that of manipulated and Moscow-controlled national Communist regimes. It was for the sake of this policy that Moscow embarked on the rash Tito *rapprochement*. The recourse to force in Hungary, brutal yet without the consistency of the Stalinist pattern, suggests that even in the USSR itself destalinization continues to grapple with forces of Stalinism. The outcome is uncertain and cannot be specifically predicted, either in terms of further Hungarian development or of the broader Soviet picture.

As for Poland, Gomulka has many difficulties ahead of him, including not only a ruined economy but above all else his own precarious position: he must steer in the direction of communism without Moscow support and without a well-organized party, amidst seas of anti-Russian hatred. If he can maintain control, however, it seems safe to judge that the existing ferment in Poland will in time have increasing effect on the internal life of his Communist neighbors, including the USSR itself.

Hints of scattered ferment in the Soviet Union itself already have come to the outside world: there have been some indications of minor student unrest and even reports of a workers' sit-down strike. The Hungarian revolt must have had a devastating effect even on the very orthodox. For here, in a sense, was a classic Marxist revolution: capitalism (of a state type) had so accentuated the material exploitation of the proletariat which it had created through rapid industrialization, that the workers, supported by the population, rose in spontaneous rebellion. New difficulties must certainly arise in a situation where some Communist states ruled by an iron hand must coexist side by side with other, more relaxed Communist regimes (assuming the latter can succeed in maintaining themselves). If Poland remains officially in Soviet good graces and retains the status of a "socialist state", then inevitably Soviet intellectuals, students, and workers will begin to wonder whether the Polish type of socialism is not preferable to their own. Their questions will be difficult to answer. It will be impossible to dismiss workers' councils or even limited intellectual freedom as examples of "bourgeois sham-democracy." However, it would be idle to expect a repetition of the Hungarian or Polish experiences in the USSR itself. There the regime has not been imposed from the outside, has far greater capacity for survival, and doubtless enjoys a greater measure of popular support or at least acceptance.

As for Moscow's satellite policy, the worst to be feared is a Kremlin decision that its own interests will best be served by a military suppression of Poland, carried out with impunity along the pattern of suppression pursued in Hungary. Under certain circumstances, Soviet leaders might conclude that disillusionment abroad, even in China, is a lesser price to pay than instability at home. But such a calculation would be logical for the Kremlin only if it had advance certitude of a free hand. In the absence of such conditions, the problems of ideology and power in Eastern Europe are likely to continue plaguing the Soviet leadership for a long time to come—and ever closer to home.

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Peiping on the March:

The Eighth Congress of the CCP

By ROBERT C. NORTH

THE Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, convened in Peiping last September, was the first held since 1945. Reviewing developments in this crucial eleven-year span of Chinese communism, Mao Tse-tung declared in an opening address that despite mistakes, his cadres on the whole had done their work "correctly":

> . . . since the Seventh Congress we have in this great country with its vast territory, huge population, and complex conditions, completed a bourgeois democratic revolution, and we have also gained a decisive victory in the socialist revolution.[1]

The task now facing the CCP, according to Mao, is to complete the transformation of China from a backward agricultural country into an industrialized socialist society. The Chinese Communist leader described this undertaking as similar to that which had faced the Soviet Union in the early years of its history. "So we must be good at studying," he said. "We must be good at learning from our forerunner . . ." [2]

The mood of the Congress was at once self-congratulatory and self-critical. In an atmosphere which one foreign reporter compared to a religious revival meeting,[3] Communist leaders one after the other hailed party successes, condemned weaknesses of past performance, and enlarged upon Mao Tse-tung's presentation of tasks ahead.

[1] Mao Tse-tung to the CCP Congress, September 15, 1956. The English text appears in *The New York Times,* September 15, 1956, and in *Current Background,* Hongkong, No. 412, September 18, 1956 (hereafter referred to as CB).

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Greg MacGregor, *The New York Times,* September 30, 1956.

Mr. North is on the faculty of the Department of Asiatic and Slavic Studies, Stanford University, California, and author of *Moscow and Chinese Communists* (Stanford University Press, 1953). His "China and India: Two Paths to Industrialization" (co-authored with Yuan-li Wu) appeared in issue No. 3, Vol. IV, (May-June 1955), of *Problems of Communism.*

In view of frequent Chinese Communist references to accomplishments and errors of the past, an outside observer can scarcely analyze the future program for domestic reform, consolidation, and industrialization without assessing these goals—and the means for achieving them—against the background of the last eleven years.

Yenan and Cheng-feng

WHEN the Seventh Congress met at Yenan (April 23-June 11, 1945) Chiang Kai-shek's government had its seat at Chungking, Japanese forces controlled large areas of China, and the Chinese Communists, taking what advantage they could of the confusion, were consolidating their strength in Border Region Governments situated, for the most part, in the Northwest.

Mao was already long established as the undisputed leader of the Chinese Communist movement. Until the early 1930's Moscow had controlled the Chinese leadership, indeed had directed every twist and turn of the Chinese Communist line. In succeeding years, however, Kremlin interest in the movement had lessened somewhat, and leaders on the scene in China had gained power through their own abilities rather than through Soviet sponsorship During this period Mao Tse-tung and Chang Kuo-t'ao, rivals in the struggle for power, led separate columns of the Long March from Kiangsi to far-off Yenan and vicinity. There Mao asserted his supremacy and, with Moscow's concurrence, eliminated Chang Kuo-t'ao from the party.

At Yenan, in 1942, Mao initiated the Cheng-feng movement to "correct undesirable and erroneous tendencies." Basing his arguments on Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist texts from the Soviet Union, he attacked party dogmatists (who relied on theory rather than action); empiricists (who refused to understand the importance of theory);[4] and sectarians (men like Chang Kuo-t'ao

[4] Mao Tse-tung, *Concerning Practice,* (Bombay, 1951), in the Editor's Note.

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who had "placed the individual first and the party second").[5]

The responsibilities of the Communist Party member were stated precisely: he should have only party interests in mind and no individual purpose. As Liu Shao-ch'i, now regarded as China's number two leader, put it at the time:

> When contradictions arise between the interest of the party and the individual, we can, without the slightest hesitation or feeling of compulsion, submit to party interests and sacrifice the individual . . .[6]

The Cheng-feng movement adapted Soviet Russian political theories and techniques to Chinese conditions. Beyond this, Mao used the movement as a purge: through it a group of high party leaders fell from power. Finally, Cheng-feng was an instrument for destroying traditional Chinese morality in favor of a Communist code of ethics and behavior, for probing the very depths of the human psyche in order to "remold" the individual party member into a being different from what he had been before.

The influence of Cheng-feng was reflected in the revised party constitution drafted by Liu Shao-chi'i and adopted at the seventh CCP Congress in 1945. According to the Preamble:

> The CCP takes the theories of Marxism-Leninism and the combined practices derived from the practical experience of the Chinese revolution—the ideas of Mao Tse-tung—as the guiding principles of all its work . . .[7]

Today—as proceedings of the Eighth Congress reveal—Chinese Communist leaders are still concerned with techniques of the Cheng-feng movement and with "remolding" the personalities of their followers.

Program for Power

EVENTS moved rapidly for the Chinese Communists. By the end of 1949, with the aid of Japanese arms turned over to them by the Soviets, they had expelled Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government from the Chinese mainland. On October 1, 1949, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the People's Republic of China operating under a provisional constitution based on the Soviet model. He admitted that it was a dictatorship of the Communist variety: "To hostile classes the state apparatus is an instrument of oppression," he said. "It is violent and not benevolent." The right of "reactionaries" (in effect, anyone who opposed the regime) to voice their opinions had to be abolished.[8] This was the political essence of the "new democracy". A new constitution, approved in September 1954 and containing a "fundamental law" to cover the transition to Bolshevik socialism, merely confirmed the course which had been indicated in the provisional document.

One of the first undertakings of the new regime was implementation of Mao's agrarian program. In all its fundamentals, Chinese Communist "land reform"—like that of the Soviets twenty years earlier—was class warfare applied to the countryside, and not in any sense a terminal economic "solution" to the basic imbalance between under-productivity and an intense and rapidly increasing population. The "struggle against the landlord" received first emphasis: his draft animals, farm implements, and surplus grain were confiscated, his land redistributed—for the time being, at least—among the poor peasants. Collectivization of peasant agriculture was to come in the future.

A primary instrument for the carrying out of Chinese agrarian reform was the People's Tribunal, which had the power to arrest and detain citizens almost at will, imposing sentences which included confiscation of property and capital punishment. In two or three years life on the countryside was completely disrupted and reshaped along the Communist pattern of rigid control.[9]

Meanwhile, the Chinese Communists were equally busy neutralizing opposition in other segments of the population. On February 21, 1951, Mao Tse-tung called for the "timely and rigorous" suppression of all counterrevolutionary activities, and his government listed more than a score of crimes—looting, wrecking, disturbing market conditions, conducting counterrevolutionary propaganda, plotting, spying, organizing jail breaks and many others—each one of which was punishable by imprisonment, life imprisonment or death.[10] Since the law operated retroactively, Mao himself could have been convicted under it—for past collaboration with the Kuomintang, if for nothing else. With grim and unconscious humor the Peiping *Men-min Shou-ts'e* (Current Affairs Journal) offered the following analysis of

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[5] Boyd Compton, *Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952), p. 24.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

[7] An English translation of the 1945 party constitution appears in Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 422-439.

[8] Mao Tse-tung, "On the Dictatorship of the People's Democracy" from an English translation of the New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA) published in the *China Digest*, Vol. VI, No. 7, July 13, 1949.

[9] CB No. 184, June 12, 1952. See also Richard L. Walker, "Collectivization in China: A Story of Betrayal," *Problems of Communism*, No. 1 (January-February) 1956 (hereafter referred to as POC).

[10] CB, No. 163, March 5, 1952.

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execution as one of the methods (along with control and imprisonment) of suppression:

> Execution means fundamental physical elimination of counterrevolutionaries and is, of course, the most thorough and severe measure of depriving counterrevolutionaries of their conditions for counterrevolutionary activities.[11]

As agrarian reform progressed, Chinese Communist leaders tightened their control over the government apparatus through the "3-Anti" campaign against corruption, decay and bureaucracy. In applying this program in the Northwest, Kao Kang, at the time the fifth-ranking leader in the party hierarchy, decreed:

> The following shall be accomplished during the present campaign . . . Purge all departments of corruption, waste and bureaucracy. Cases of corruption and waste shall be given penalties ranging from dismissal, prison terms, and labor reform to the death sentence.[12]

Precisely how many Chinese were executed under these laws cannot be fixed, but even the most conservative estimates run into several millions. Later Kao Kang himself was purged "for conspiratorial activities aimed at seizing the reins of leadership of the party and the state." [13] The expulsion, announced in 1955 and discussed with satisfaction before the Eighth Congress by Liu Shao-ch'i, seemed somewhat superfluous since Kao Kang, it was revealed, had committed suicide a year earlier.[14]

When reform in the countryside was well underway and controls over the government had been tightened, Mao initiated the "5-Anti" struggle against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state assets, cheating and theft of state economic secrets—a program frankly labelled by Communist leaders as a broad class struggle against the bourgeoisie, whose services they had hitherto willingly accepted in the building of the new China.[15]

Following the "5-Anti" campaign came an announcement in early 1953 of the First Five-Year Plan, aimed at transforming China from an agricultural into an industrial nation along the pattern of "Bolshevik socialism." [16] Chinese Communist writers, with quotations from Lenin and Stalin, made it clear that in undertaking this task, the People's Republic "follows the path of the Soviet Union which, guided by Marxist-Leninist economic theory, accomplished such transformation at a speed unprecedented in history." [17]

As in the Soviet Union, the human cost of this transformation process has been high. Undoubtedly, Chinese Communist planners have increased national production—but only through intimidation and regimentation, the reduction of individual consumption (abysmally low to begin with), and the systematic employment of forced labor.[18] Estimates of the number of individuals sentenced to forced labor in Communist China vary from about 14 millions upward. Clearly, the precise figure cannot be fixed, but all reports suggest a staggering number of victims involved.[19]

In the countryside, too, Chinese Communist leaders were moving toward a first stage of Bolshevik socialism: during 1955-1956 the peasantry were organized into collectives at an astonishing rate. In the summer of 1955, according to Norris P. Smith, only 15 percent of China's more than 110 million households were organized into producers' cooperatives, which are not, properly speaking, collectivized. But a year later more than 100 million households (or 90.4 percent of the peasantry) had been pressured into cooperative organizations, 73 million of them (or 61.1 percent) into "higher, fully socialist cooperatives" identical with collectives in other Communist countries.[20] The "socialist transformation of agriculture", Liu Shao-chi'i told the Eighth Congress, had largely been accomplished within four years after the completion of "land reform." [21]

Achievements and Admissions

TAKEN in sum, these various developments suggest that the Chinese Communists had good reasons for opening the Congress of their party on a self-congratulatory note. Central Committeeman Teng Hsiao-p'ing could report, moreover, that membership in the party

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[11] *Ibid.*, No. 101, July 24, 1951.

[12] *Ibid.*, No. 163.

[13] "Resolution on the Kao Kang-Jao Shu-shih Anti-Party Alliance". *Ibid.*, No. 324, April 5, 1955.

[14] See Peter S. H. Tang, "The Power Struggle in the Chinese C.P.: The Kao-Jao Purge," POC, No. 6 (November-December), 1955.

[15] Yang Erh, "Refuting the Ridiculous Views of the Bourgeois Class," CB, No. 199, March 14, 1952.

[16] See Richard L. Walker, "The 'Working Class' in Communist China," POC, No. 3-4 (May-August), 1953.

[17] Li Chen, "How China will Industrialize", *People's China*, February 1, 1953, p. 10.

[18] See Yuan-li Wu and Robert C. North, "China and India: Two Paths to Industrialization", POC, No. 3. (May-June), 1956.

[19] Yuan-li Wu, *An Economic Survey of Communist China*, (New York: Bookman Associates, 1956), pp. 322-325. See also Karl A. Wittfogel, "Forced Labor in Communist China", POC, No. 4, (July-August), 1956.

[20] N. P. Smith, "Mao's Forced March to Collectivization", POC, No. 5, (September-October), 1956. According to Liu Shao-ch'i, 110 million households had been organized into one million cooperatives at the time of the Eighth Congress. Peiping, NCNA in English Morse to Europe, September 16, 1956. Also CB, No. 412.

[21] Peiping, NCNA broadcast to Europe, September 16, 1956.

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(now numbering 10,743,384 persons) had increased 800 percent since the Seventh Congress in 1945.[22] Primarily of peasant membership, the CCP is the largest Communist Party in the world.[23]

If Chinese Communist leaders could congratulate themselves, they could also afford a measure of self-criticism. As Mao declared:

. . . Since our campaign in 1942 to rectify the style of work in the party, we have done much to strengthen Marxist-Leninist education within the party . . . yet among many of our comrades there are standpoints and styles of work which are contrary to Marxism-Leninism, namely subjectivism in their ways of thinking, bureaucracy in their ways of work, and sectarianism in organizational questions.[24]

One such errant comrade by his own admission was Li Li-san, Communist leader of the late 1920's, whose speech at the Congress was interesting as an example of the public confessional technique of self-criticism commonly used by the Chinese Communists. A victim of early Kremlin control over the Chinese movement, Li Li-san had been called to the Soviet Union in 1931 (after Soviet-inspired policies had failed), induced to "confess his errors" and required by the Soviet leadership to "stay here and study a few months and work with the Comintern to correct his mistakes" (he did not return to China until 1945).[25] Li Li-san "confessed" at the Congress that for 26 years he had been making

[22] Teng Hsiao-ping, "Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution", September 26, 1956; in CB, No. 417, October 10, 1956.

[23] The membership of the CCP is said to include 1,500,000 workers, 5,360,000 poor peasants, 2,050,000 middle income peasants, 1,250,000 intellectuals, and 550,000 persons from other groups in the population. See Harry Schwartz, *The New York Times,* September 30, 1956.

[24] Mao Tse-tung to the CCP Congress, *The New York Times,* September 16, 1956. Also CB, No. 412.

[25] Li Li-san, "Self Criticism of Past Mistakes", CB, No. 419, October 12, 1956.

The Struggle Against "Counterrevolutionaries"

PAST ERRORS. . . .

It should be pointed out that our public security organizations have some shortcomings and have committed some mistakes in the work of implementing the party line, some of which are serious. . . . In 1951 in some places, arrests were made in some cases where the warrants might well have been withheld rather than issued, and a very small nmber of counterrevolutionaries were executed in cases where the death sentence might well have been withheld, and even a few innocent people were wrongly arrested. In the latter part of 1955, some errors were also made. . . . A few public security organs and certain public security officers have resorted to the practice of commandism and isolated themselves from the broad masses. They have committed the mistakes of violating law and discipline and have even resorted to the practice of applying torture and extorting confessions, thereby creating a very bad effect on the masses . . . . Shortcomings still exist in our legal system. In some places, arrests have not been made in accordance with court and procuratorate procedures. In individual cases, mistreatment of criminals has been noted. Certain deviations have also been found in criminal investigation and police work with the result that the masses have not been closely aligned.

NOT TO BE REPEATED?. . . .

We should hereafter implement the party's correct line in a better way and strive for victory in our struggle against counterrevolutionaries. . . . The struggle against counterrevolutionaries is not and will not be over. There is still a long struggle ahead with the opposition forces. Although our enemy has been greatly weakened after suffering repeated blows, and counterrevolutionaries have been greatly reduced in number, they have not yet been thoroughly stamped out . . .

—Lo Jui-ch'ing, speech to the Eighth CCP Congress, September 19, 1956.

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mistakes and that these had been particularly grave while he was working with trade unions in 1950; at this time, he said, the party "carried out a successful operation" on him, improving his ideological health and preventing the commission of graver errors.[26]

As for mistakes of the regime as a whole, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Minister of Public Security, admitted that innocent persons had been arrested, prisoners maltreated, confessions extorted by force, individuals executed without sufficient reason, and other serious errors committed "in pursuit of justice."[27] In fact, as Tung Pi-wu, President of the Supreme People's Court, told the Congress, the Communist regime was still lacking a criminal code, a civil code, a code of procedure and other fundamental laws.[28] The development of such codes within a strictly-controlled Communist framework was stressed as a primary task facing the party and the government. The concepts and procedures of the Cheng-feng movement, it was said, should stand as a model: according to Lo Jui-ch'ing, severity combined with prudence, and punishment combined with leniency were to remain the guiding (if somewhat contradictory) principles for eradicating those who oppose the government.[29]

Party Organization

ALTHOUGH the Eighth Congress approved a number of amendments to the party constitution adopted in 1945, there were no changes basically altering the nature of the CCP or its functions, or the highly disciplined role of the individual member. The party Congress, elected for five years, is scheduled to meet annually. In at least surface harmony with recent Soviet developments, the new constitution stipulates that "every party organization should strictly abide by the principle of collective leadership coupled with individual responsibility."[30] References to the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" have been deleted—though it should be emphasized, in this connection, that he was reelected Chairman of the Central Committee and of the Politburo, both of which, along with the Secretariat, have been considerably enlarged. Provisions are made for a Standing Committee of the Politburo, for one or more Vice-Chairmen, and for a General Secretary of the Central Committee. The party committee at the district level, between provincial and *hsien* levels, has been abolished, and it is stipulated that control committees, hitherto established at the discretion of the Central Committee, must be created for all levels of the party structure from the Central Committee down to the *hsien* committee. According to Article 2, every party member is required to place the interests of party and state above personal interests and in the event of conflict "to submit unswervingly to the interests of the party and the state . . ."

The new Central Committee consists of 97 permanent members and 73 alternates. Two former Politburo members who have played relatively unimportant roles during recent years—K'ang Sheng and Chang Wen-t'ien—were relegated to the newly-created posts of alternate members of that body. All remaining members of the former 13-man Politburo have been reelected, and they are joined by six newcomers. The new standing committee of the Politburo consists of Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Chen Yun, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who retains the post of Secretary General.[31] Former alternate members of the Central Committee were raised almost as a body to full membership, and new members and alternates were drawn largely from the ranks of important office holders of the central government and from the provincial governments.

Friendly Hand from the Kremlin

PRESENT at the Eighth Congress, along with representatives from other Communist parties of the world, was a Soviet delegation headed by A. I. Mikoyan, a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and first Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Statements by members of this delegation suggested that the Soviet Union was now making a major bid for even closer ties with the Chinese Communists. Stalin had made it clear that Soviet hegemony in the world Communist movement must remain unquestioned, and only he among Communist leaders was accorded official credit as a theoretician and party ideologist. Mikoyan, in contrast, credited Mao Tse-tung with major contributions to Marxist-Leninist theory and hailed him as a creative adapter and developer of Leninism. In achieving—through a transitional stage of state capitalism—the participation of the national bourgeoisie in the work of revolutionary forces, and in adapting certain tactics to collectivize farmers and to wipe out private enterprise, the Chinese had found "distinctly new forms and meth-

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[26] Li Li-san's Conclusions, *Bolshevik*, Moscow, May 10, 1931.

[27] Lo Jui-ch'ing, "The Struggle Against Counter Revolutionaries", September 19, 1956; in CB No. 420, October 16, 1956.

[28] Tung Pi-wu, "The Legal System of China", *Ibid.*

[29] Lo Jui-ch'ing, *Ibid.*

[30] Text of the CCP Constitution of 1956, *Ibid.*, No. 417.

[31] Peiping, NCNA, September 27, 1956. Politburo members, in addition to these are Lin Piao, Lin Po-ch'u, Tung Pi-wu, P'eng Chen, Lo Jung-huan, Ch'en Yi, Li Fu-ch-un, Pe'ng Teh-huai, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ho Lung, and Li Hsien-nien.

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ods in building socialism," said Mikoyan.[32] (How this participation of the national bourgeoisie—what is left of them—has been achieved can be inferred from an examination of the "5-Anti" laws and the penalties for their infraction).

In certain respects Chinese ties with the Soviet Union over the last 30 years have been a mixed blessing to the Chinese Communists. Between 1924 and 1934 Stalin's high-handed intervention brought one defeat after another to the Chinese Communist Party—often at the cost of Chinese Communist lives; and later, when Mao needed aid from the Soviet Union, it was largely advice that he received. Even after the foundation of the People's Republic, Stalin gave Mao ridiculously small amounts of aid as compared with the needs of China. There have been indications of Soviet-Chinese tensions, too, in areas such as North Korea, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang, where the interests of the two nations are in conflict.

Soviet economic and technical aid to the People's Republic has increased enormously since Stalin's death, however, and Mikoyan promised the Eighth Congress that the USSR would help lift Communist China from technical backwardness to the summit of modern scientific advances. "Fraternal cooperation in technology, science and culture," he said, "saves the Chinese from the need to go through all the preparatory stages . . ." In view of the rapid consolidation of Chinese Communist power, of increasing opposition among European satellite states to Soviet domination, and of persistent rumors of sympathetic interchanges between Chinese Communist leaders and Polish and Hungarian deviationists, an outside observer would conclude that the Soviet Union had good reasons for seeking to improve relations with the People's Republic of China.

Future Plans and Projections

CHINESE Communist leaders emphasized at the Eighth Congress that for the achievement of Bolshevik socialism in their country they would continue to adopt from Soviet experience. It was calculated that a total of three Five-Year Plans would be needed for the completion of industrialization in China. Heavy industry goals of the First Five-Year Plan, according to Chinese Communist predictions, would be over-fulfilled by its termination date next year. The Second Five-Year Plan is designed to continue this development in terms of five major objectives: industrial construction with emphasis on heavy industry; continued ideological indoctrination, social transformation and "remolding" of individuals; increased industrial, agricultural and handicraft production and the development of transportation and commerce; increased efforts to wipe out illiteracy and to train personnel for construction, scientific research, and national defence; and the achievement of higher levels of material and cultural life after the Communist pattern.[33]

Contributory to these objectives were plans for the selective development of light industry (especially for the production of machine tools), for the achievement of a clear distinction between central and local administrative authority,[34] and for the tightening of party supervision over state organs and of supervision within the hierarchy of government.[35]

Special emphasis, under the Second Five-Year Plan, has been placed on the development of bases for the steel and iron industry in Central China and in Inner Mongolia, and of iron-steel-hydroelectric complexes in Southwest and Northwest China and in the Sanmen Gorge area.[36]

According to Chou En-lai, the actual amount of money spent on the Second Five-Year Plan will be twice that spent on the First Five-Year Plan—with accompanying increases in revenue collection. By 1962, he said, the value of China's industrial production will be double that planned for 1957, and the value of agricultural production will be 35 percent higher than the 1957 goal.[37] Neither he nor any of his colleagues indicated precisely what this vast development would mean in terms of human regimentation and deprivation.

Po I-po suggested that the proportion of national income set aside for capital investment should be about 20 percent "more or less" as compared with 18.3 percent in 1953, a ratio made possible only by the stringent control of consumption.[38] According to a qualified observer, Dr. Yuan-li Wu of Marquette University:

> **There is no doubt that a 20 percent ratio of gross investment to gross national product would require continued strict control of consumption. But this is not impossible, especially if, as previous investment begins to take shape in**

[32] A. I. Mikoyan, transmitted by Moscow, TASS, in English Hellschreiber, September 17, 1956. Also CB, No. 415, October 8, 1956.

[33] Liu Shao-ch'i Peiping, NCNA in English Morse to Europe September 16, 1956.

[34] Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Peiping, NCNA in English Morse to Europe, September 16, 1956.

[35] Liu Shao-ch'i, *loc. cit.*

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] Chou En-lai, "Report on the Second Five-Year Plan", September 16, 1956; in CB, No. 413, October 5, 1956.

[38] Transmitted by Peiping, NCNA, in Chinese Hellschreiber, September 19, 1956. Po I-po gave other proportions of the accumulation sector in the national income as 15.7% in 1952, 21.6% in 1954, and 20.4% in 1955 and 22.8% in 1956.

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the form of finished plant and equipment, the national product is itself increased.[39]

Communist leaders, evidently, are not unaware of the heavy burden which the industrialization program has already placed upon the populace. Teng Hsiao-p'ing promised the Eighth Congress that during the Second Five-Year Plan workers would enjoy substantial wage increases and urged that the party "correctly solve" the problem of peasant burdens by achieving a suitable balance between the income of the state and the income of the cooperatives, and between the aggregate wealth of the cooperatives and the income of cooperative members.[40] At the same time, however, Ch'en Yun warned that prices were likely to rise for the time being as the result of "encouraging a free market within a planned economy."[41] There was no indication of the extent to which projects under the Second Five-Year Plan would utilize forced labor. But if the record of the immediate past is any criterion, Chinese Communist leaders will seek the narrowest possible margin between requirements of the state and a burden which the populace might be unwilling or unable to bear.

Essential to the building of a "prosperious, strong, and highly industrialized state," Ch'en Yi told the Congress, is the securing of "a peaceful international environment over a fairly long period."[42] In the same speech, however, he reiterated the determination of his government to incorporate Formosa under its power—whether by peaceful means or otherwise. And at the very time when Chinese Communist armed forces were occupying areas of northern Burma, Ch'en Yi declared Peiping's "dedication to peace," reasserted its support of the *Panch Shila* with India and Burma (an agreement avowing mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence), and solemnly insisted that China's revolution was "not for export."

What emerges from the Eighth Congress, therefore, is the picture of a totalitarian government dedicated in purpose, confident in its successes, Machiavellian in its foreign relations, and ruthless in domestic regimentation and the exploitation of human lives for ends of state. How Chinese Communist leaders will deploy their rapidly developing strength is difficult to predict. For the time being they find themselves dependent upon the economic and technical aid which Soviet leaders, in turn, can scarcely refuse to grant. But the Soviets, in giving this support, contribute to the growth of an increasingly formidable rival, and in the long run it might be the Chinese who will hold decisive power in the disturbed balance of Communist forces.

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[39] Yuan-li Wu in a letter to the author, October 28, 1956. See Dr. Wu's *An Economic Survey of Communist China.* (New York, 1956), for an analysis of the First Five-Year Plan.

[40] Peiping, NCNA, in English Morse to Europe, September 16, 1956.

[41] Transmitted by Peiping, NCNA, in Chinese Hellschreiber, September 21, 1956.

[42] Ch'en Yi, "The International Situation and our Foreign Policy" September 25, 1956; in CB, No. 414, October 6, 1956.

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The Soviet Doctor's Dilemma

By MARK G. FIELD

Editors' Note: Soviet politics cannot be understood without a comprehension of the nature of Soviet society; the two are closely interrelated, even though the connection may not be readily apparent. It may, for instance, be difficult to see what the position of the doctor in the USSR has to do with, say, Soviet foreign policy. Yet—as Mr. Field's article shows—the connection is there, for both are a function of the mechanics of a totalitarian system. "The Soviet Doctor's Dilemma" is one of Problems of Communism's *continuing series of sociological studies on the Soviet Union, the last of which was William Petersen's "The Evolution of Soviet Family Policy," in issue No. 5 (September-October), 1956.*

SOCIALIZED medicine is presented to the Soviet population as one more brilliant achievement of the Soviet regime, a supreme expression of its "concern for the individual" (*zabota o cheloveke*), possible only under Soviet conditions. Much is made of this solicitude toward the humble citizen. Indeed it is often contrasted with the alleged unconcern for the average man under the Tsarist regime and in contemporary capitalist societies—where "the working man does not count . . . where only profits matter . . ." [1]

Under Tsarism, Soviet propagandists assert, medical care and the service of the doctor were only for the rich, the well-born and the bourgeoisie. Beyond what was done for them by a few well-meaning physicians and charitable organizations, the workers and peasants had no medical care, nor could they afford any.[2] All this has been changed in Soviet Russia, the Russian citizen is assured. "The government does not scrimp money to protect the people's health." [3]

[1] "Persistently Improve Workers' Medical Care," *Trud,* July 5, 1951.

[2] M. N. Mukhanova, "The Most Advanced Social Insurance in the World," *Trud,* November 4, 1949.

[3] *Izvestia,* August 26, 1948.

Mr. Field, the author of several articles on the medical profession in the USSR, will soon publish a book on the subject. His most recent contribution to *Problems of Communism* was "Drink and Delinquency in the USSR", No. 3 (May-June), 1955. Mr. Field visited the Soviet Union in 1956.

Evidence supports the contention that, quantitatively, medical services available to the people of the Soviet Union have improved enormously.[4] The number of hospital beds rose from 176,000 in 1913 to 247,000 in 1928; 791,000 in 1940; 1,011,000 in 1950; and 1,290,000 at the end of 1955.[5] There were about 24,000 doctors in Russia before the Revolution; the official figure for 1955 is 334,000.[6]

Under the Soviet system, however, the expansion of medical institutions has been accompanied by the creation of a large bureaucratic apparatus to administer them and to keep the physician under state control. This has in turn affected medical organization, redefined the role and social position of the physician, and introduced certain non-medical elements into the patient-physician relationship. Contrary to the expectations raised by official propaganda, the Soviet patient encounters all kinds of deficiencies and shortages in medical care, bureaucratic inefficiency and indifference, physicians who act more like policemen than doctors, overcrowded facilities, and often the lack of the most common medicine.[7]

Such shortcomings exist mainly in the medical service available to the ordinary citizen. Medical care, like

[4] This paper does not discuss the quality of Soviet medicine —*i.e.,* the professional competence of Soviet physicians or specialists. Such evaluation is left to those who are professionally qualified to judge. See, for example, T. F. Fox, "Russia Revisited: Impressions of Soviet Medicine," *The Lancet,* October 9 and 16, 1954, pp. 748-53 and 803-7. Also see report of trip made by Major Paul W. Schafer, in *The New York Times,* August 28, 1955, p. 16; and Michael B. Shimkin, *The American Medical Mission on Microbiology and Epidemiology to the Soviet Union,* February-March 1956, (mimeographed, in author's files).

[5] *The Economy of the USSR: Statistical Handbook,* Moscow, 1955, p. 244., (in Russian). These figures do not include military hospitals.

[6] *Ibid.,* (exclusive of military doctors).

[7] The present paper is based on official Soviet sources (such as *Meditsinsky rabotnik,* organ of the Health Ministry), on intensive interviews with former Soviet citizens, particularly medical personnel, conducted under the auspices of the Project on the Soviet Social System, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, and on the author's personal observations in the course of a recent trip to the USSR.

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other components of the Soviet living standard, is differentiated according to social position and official rank, and the higher the rank the better the service.[8] The present paper will deal first with such differentiation in medical service and then with certain aspects of the physician's role in Soviet society.

"Class" Distinctions in Medical Care

BASICALLY there are two types of medical "networks": the general and the closed or restricted network. The general network is maintained by the Ministry of Health or by industrial organizations (under the Ministry's supervision), and its function is to dispense Soviet "socialized medicine" to the mass of ordinary Soviet citizens. Medical services in the general network, are of poorer standard than those available in the restricted network, particularly in rural areas and on the collective farms.

Within the restricted system there are two classes of medical facilities. The first serves the employees of certain administrations. There are, for example, medical networks reserved respectively for Army and Navy personnel, for the lower-echelon workers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and for railroad workers. These organizations maintain their own separate hospitals, polyclinics and rest homes. In the larger cities the difference between these facilities and those provided by the general network may be slight. In the smaller towns and rural areas, however, the facilities in a "closed" clinic of this type probably are substantially superior to those available to the ordinary public.

The second type of closed network, and the one on which the least amount of information is available, consists of the medical installations reserved for the top stratum of party, government and administrative officials. When a Soviet citizen refers to a "closed polyclinic" *(zakritaia poliklinika)* he usually means a clinic reserved for the "big shots." Within this category there is, again, a whole gradation depending on rank, extending up to the very apex of the official pyramid.[9] Even within the Kremlin walls medical care and hospitalization are divided into well-defined categories; the higher the rank of the patient the better, of course, the facilities and the more individual attention he gets from the doctors. At this level the quality of medical care compares with the best available in the West.[10]

Below the system of Kremlin polyclinics and rest homes there are, in every major town, closed facilities reserved for the local party and government elite. In small localities, where the number of high officials does not warrant a special building, a part of the existing medical facilities may be set aside for them. There, everything from the physicians to the attending personnel, furniture, and food is better than in the "ordinary" wing. Medical care in the closed network is also provided by the state at no cost to the patient.

Position and Prestige of the Doctor

GENERALLY speaking, the position and prestige of the medical profession is somewhat lower than that of most other professions. *The Soviet hero is not the healer but the man who builds machinery for industry or the one who fights for the cause.* And, by the same token, the financial rewards which doctors can command compare unfavorably (with certain exceptions) with those of government officials or skilled industrial workers. The living and working conditions of the average Soviet doctor were discussed in two articles published three years ago in *Literaturnaia gazeta,* organ of the Union of Soviet Writers. The articles quoted the complaints of a physician named Kremneva over the prevailing level of pay among doctors:

> . . . at the time the doctor finishes the medical institute he receives 600 rubles a month and, after ten years of practice, 800 rubles. And this regardless of the experience he has had . . . Is that fair? I think it is quite unfair. But then is all this not known to the Ministry of Health? . . . to the Union of Medical Workers? It is clear that they consider it "indelicate" [*neprilichno*] or, as they sometimes put it, "untimely" to consider these thorny questions now . . . [11]

Discussions of salary are hardly indelicate, Dr. Kremneva goes on, since a doctor's living standards closely affect the quality of his work.

In the course of a recent trip to the Soviet Union, this author was struck by the low salaries ordinary physicians received as compared to the salaries of the people they treated. For example, during a visit to the Kharkov Electro-Mechanical Plant I was told that most qualified workers earned approximately 2000 rubles a month. The physician at the plant's *Zdravpunkt* (dispensary), however, stated that he earned only about 900 rubles. The average physician's salary was reported to be about 750 rubles to 800 rubles a month.

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[8] Alex Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: 1940-1950", *American Sociological Review,* No. 15 (August 1950), pp. 465-479; W. W. Kulski, "Classes in the Classless State," *Problems of Communism,* Vol. 4, (January-February), pp. 20-8.

[9] David J. Dallin, *The New Soviet Empire,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, p. 138; see also R. Traho, "The Health Resorts of the Caucasus," *Caucasian Review,* No. 1 (1955), pp. 100-111.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] In "Readers Continue the Discussion of 'Hours and Minutes of the Physician,'" *Literaturnaia gazeta,* June 18, 1953, p. 2.

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Title Caption: THE IMAGINARY PATIENT
Caption below, left: Before entering the technical school.
Caption below, right: And when summoned for duty in the provinces.
[The papers are "medical certificates" indicating ill health—Ed.]

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), May 10, 1951.

The doctor is also at a relative disadvantage *vis-à vis* other members of the intelligentsia when it comes to obtaining housing and furnishings. Housing, for example, is assigned first to party and other officials, then to technical and other specialists: only what is left over is available to physicians.[12] This incongruity between the importance of the doctor's function and the reward he receives is probably the deterrent that turns many talented young people away from medicine. It is interesting to note in this connection that *in the Soviet Union medicine has become a woman's occupation: about seven to eight out of ten doctors are women,* whereas before the Revolution the figure was less than one in ten.[13] On the other hand, there is evidence that most of the top jobs in Soviet medicine are held by men rather than women.[14] This was confirmed by personal observation during the author's stay in the USSR. One important exception, however, is the Minister of Health for the USSR, the first woman ever to occupy the post.

Of equal sociological interest is the fact that there is no such thing as an independent association of physicians. Since the Soviet regime feared that autonomous professional associations would constitute independent loci of power, all pre-revolutionary medical associations were declared illegal on the ground that they were "counterrevolutionary."[15] They were replaced by a nationwide structure, the Union of Medical Workers, through which the regime maintains strict control over physicians, dictating in minute detail methods of work and procedures to be followed.

The Union has also been used as a political weapon through which members of the medical profession can be accused of malpractice with complete immunity on the part of the regime. The most notorious example of

[12] See, for example, "Village Physician," *Trud,* March 26, 1950; "A Matter of Honor for the Trade Union," *Meditsinsky rabotnik,* June 22, 1952; "Little Concern for Rural Doctors," *ibid.,* March 22, 1955; "Words and Deeds," *ibid.,* June 17, 1951; "Young Specialist," *ibid.,* July 1, 1955.

[13] *Great Soviet Encyclopedia.* 2nd ed. Vol. 9, pp. 238-9.

[14] A sampling of more than 1200 doctors' names taken from *Meditsinsky rabotnik* in the postwar years reveals that 78 percent of men physicians held some kind of administrative or academic position, while the corresponding figure among women was only 40 percent. Among high-ranking physicians, 81 percent were men, 19 percent women. (From the author's, "The Medical Profession in Soviet Society," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1955, pp. 400 *ff.*)

[15] Dr. G. Shulz, "Review of M. I. Barsukov, *Bolshaia Oktyabrskaia revoliutsia i organizatsia sovetskovo zdravookhranenia,* (Moscow: Medgiz, 1951)," in *Bulletin of the Institute of the History and Institutions of the USSR,* Munich, 1951, pp. 170-3.

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this was the trumped-up "doctors' plot" of early 1953, just before Stalin's death. In this affair, nine Soviet physicians, including some of the most prominent, were charged with the deliberate murder of several highly placed patients. The following lines from *Pravda* record the violence of the accusations:

> Comrades A. A. Zhdanov and A. S. Shcherbakov fell victims of this gang of human monsters. The criminals admitted that they had made use of Comrade Zhdanov's illness, purposely hid the fact he had an infarct myocardia, ordered a regimen that was contra-indicated for this type of serious illness, and in this way hastened his death. Doctor-murderers, through the incorrect use of strongly-acting medications and through a harmful regimen, shortened Comrade Shcherbakov's life, drove him to his death.[16]

No graver accusation could have been levelled at doctors dedicated by the very nature of their occupation to the preservation of human life; and yet no voice from the medical profession was raised—or could have been raised—to demand that an impartial commission be appointed to examine the facts.[17] Instead, one woman doctor, Lydia Timachuk, received the Order of Lenin for "unmasking the physician-murderers," and leading Soviet newspapers published poems in her praise. After Stalin's death, the "doctors' plot" was declared to have been a frame-up. The accused doctors were released from prison and rehabilitated, while Dr. Timachuk became the new convenient scapegoat—she lost her Order of Lenin and was sent to jail.

Control Over Medical Work

IN order to assert and maintain their operational control over the medical profession, the regime and the bureaucratic organizations that employ physicians must perforce standardize the doctor's work. One aspect of such standardization is the imposition of precise time norms upon the physician.[18] While the doctor in private practice in an unregimented society budgets his time according to his professional standards and case load, under the Soviet bureaucratic system time allocation appears to be done *by* the bureaucracy *for* the physician. In a sense, *patients cease being the physician's patients and become the system's patients.* The bureaucracy determines how the collective time of *its* physicians will be distributed among *its* patients. A time norm is allocated to each doctor, and he must perform his services within this limit. The Ministry of Health, for example, has established that a physician working in a dispensary *must see not less than six patients per hour and should spend no more than ten minutes with each patient.* Norms vary slightly with different specialties: surgeons must examine ten patients per hour; clinicians, gynecologists and obstetricians six (seven in the out-patient department); otolaryngologists, eight; dentists, two. One house call is considered the equivalent of three office visits.[19]

There have been occasional criticisms of these norms in the Soviet press on the grounds that they were outdated and overlooked the physician's tremendous load of paper work. For example:

> How often is it that general practitioners simply forget the part played by psychological factors in illness . . . The question will be asked, how can we find time for this type of approach when the doctor must see not less than six patients per hour?[20]

Despite some protest, however, there has been no apparent move toward revision of the time norms. A 1953 study of the work of two general practitioners (see table on page 29) is of interest in this respect.[21] It will be noted that almost half of the average of 8.15 minutes spent by the doctors with each patient was consumed by paper work exclusive of the reading and writing of the case histories. The fact of the matter is that the only manner in which a Soviet doctor can manipulate bureaucratic rules to enforce his own set of medical values is to juggle his allotted time by dispatching one patient in a few seconds and giving another more than the officially-sanctioned share. In this situation the physician is constantly fighting a battle against the clock and must feel unavoidably that his examination in many cases is superficial.

The Doctor and Labor Discipline

THE state attaches great importance to the physician's role in maintaining labor discipline and fulfilling production plans. He is constantly urged to adopt and maintain a "responsible attitude" in evaluating requests for sick leave. In the official view:

> . . . to be a true Leninist, to show the spirit of the party in all his actions and activities, the doctor must relate all

[16] January 13, 1953, p. 1.

[17] *The Thaw,* Ilya Ehrenburg's unusually frank novel depicting this period, discusses the position of a local Jewish physician following the "discovery" of the "doctors' plot." The passages alluded to are on pp. 28-9 and 68 of the English translation published by Henry Regnery (Chicago, 1955). For a discussion of Ehrenburg's novel see Jeri Laber, "The Soviet Writer's Search for New Values," *Problems of Communism,* Vol. 5 (January-February, 1955), pp. 14-20.

[18] See *Protocols of the Harvard Refugee Interview Project,* Schedule On the Professions, B 11 (Hereinafter cited as Protocols): Nos. 607, p. 23; 353, p. 11; 376, pp. 9-10; 449, p. 41; 607, p. 12; 1757, pp. 10-11. See also Jerzy Gliksman, *Tell the West,* New York: Gresham, 1948, pp. 250 and 259.

[19] N. W. Rovinsky, *Gosudarstvennyi biudzhet SSSR* [USSR State Budget] Moscow, 1951, p. 290.

[20] Dr. Siletskaia, "An Important Element in Therapy," *Meditsinsky rabotnik,* January 17, 1952, p. 3.

[21] "Hours and Minutes of the Physician," *Literaturnaia gazeta,* May 7, 1953, p. 1.

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the interests of his occupation first with the interests of his people, with the fate of his country . . . he is an enthusiastic patriot of his Soviet Motherland and despises her enemies . . . he must have the ability to find the borderline between health and sickness . . . The Soviet doctor must sift from the total mass of healthy individuals those few who are really sick, who need medical help, or change of work . . .[22]

A brief review of the mechanics of granting sick leaves will show precisely how the physician's role is integrated into the system of labor controls. A worker who is sick is entitled to part payment of his salary prorated according to the length of his employment at his current job. The plant trade union organization administers this payment, but only after the worker presents an official "bulletin" issued and signed by a physician in his official capacity on the staff of a plant clinic or neighborhood dispensary. Bulletins signed by a private physician or by a "paying" polyclinic have no validity in this respect. The bulletin itself is numbered, one copy remaining at the clinic while another is given to the patient. When the latter reports back to work, he gives his copy to the attendance checker, who notes on it the type of work done by the worker and the number of days absent from work. After the foreman verifies this data, the bulletin is sent to the clinic, where the physician in charge of the particular shop of the patient checks it, registers it, and sends it on to the personnel department. There the worker's labor book is examined and the length of uninterrupted work at the plant is noted. The bulletin then goes to the shop social insurance commission's chairman, who verifies the bulletin and enters on the individual's union record the fact that he has received one. Only then, and only if the commission's decision has been favorable, can the payroll department begin its calculation of the compensation due.[23]

It can be presumed that trade union inspectors, as well as doctors employed by the trade union for this purpose, constantly watch the curve of absenteeism caused by illness, and that a physician who consistently grants more sick leaves than his colleagues will have some explaining to do.

[22] S. Tikhodeev, "An Ideological Sketch of the Soviet Physician," *Meditsinsky rabotnik,* June 19, 1947.

[23] "On Guard Over the Workers' Health," *V pomoshch professionalnomu aktivu,* No. 12, June 1953, pp. 23-4.

TABLE I

Time Study of Two Soviet Doctors' Work

City of Zaporozhe, Ukraine, 1953

Name of Doctor	Procedure	*Minutes Spent*	*Percentage of total*	*Average number of minutes per patient*
Dr. Maria Stepanovna Pasechik (22 patients)	Listening to and examining patients	33	18	1.9
	Taking blood pressure	9	5	
	Reading and writing case histories	56	31	2.6
	"Paper work"	82	46	3.7
	Total	180	100%	8.2 minutes
Dr. Maria Kuzminina Sorokova (26 patients)	Listening to and examining patients, taking blood pressure	45	22	1.7
	Reading and writing case histories	70	33	2.7
	"Paper work"	95	45	3.7
	Total	210	100%	8.1 minutes

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The physician is strictly limited also in the number of days of sick leave he can prescribe for a patient. Usually he can grant three days' leave and renew the certificate twice for equal periods, but no physician alone has the authority to grant more than ten days.[24] The patient who requires further leave is referred to a Consultative Medical Commission (*Vrachebnaia Konsultativnaia Kommissia,* or VKK) which determines (1) whether the doctor was justified in excusing the patient in the first place, and (2) what should be done with the patient, i.e., should he be returned to work, kept under observation, or hospitalized.[25] If the disability is considered permanent, the patient is sent to the Medical Commission for Determining Work [Capacity] (*Vrachebnaia Trudovaia Expertiznaia Kommissia,* or VTEK), which is under the Ministry of Social Security, and which determines degrees of disability and amount of pension.

The physician's responsibility for issuing temporary disability certificates presents him with another set of problems. For in the Soviet Union, where the constant drive to increase production and productivity is coupled with chronic shortages of manpower and consumer goods, the regime finds it necessary to bolster material incentives with all kinds of repressive labor institutions and laws; and the inevitable consequence is that a large number of malingerers and workers try to escape the penalties written into the labor laws by obtaining medical excuses.[26] Former Soviet physicians who worked in factory dispensaries and on collective farms before World War II reported that a great deal of their time and nervous energy was taken up in dealing with such malingerers and violators of labor regulations. One Ukrainian woman doctor reported the situation as follows:

> It is something terrible. It is such a torture (*muchenie*) that I still have nightmares about it. Many of the would-be patients appeared when the late arrival laws went into effect (1940). A good 50 percent of the cases at the railroad clinic where I worked were only fakers. A man wants a rest . . . maybe he wants to stand in line to buy a coat or something. Or there were people who overslept and were late. Since one had to stand in line after shifts and work and cook, life was very hard. Thus sleep was a dead man's sleep and it was hard to get up in the morning. Moreover, the majority of them had no watches. As soon as a worker sees he is late, he goes directly to the doctor . . . there are some who are afraid to tell the truth [to the doctor] and thus feel they have to deceive him, and with that kind of patient it is very difficult to deal. They start dreaming up what bothers them. They know for example that X-rays are not immediately available and they say: "I want an X-ray . . ." and if you send them there this will already be a reason for arriving late at work.[27]

The physicians themselves have to take measures to dam the flow of claimants, and they acquire skill in weeding out the phony and undeserving cases from those who really need medical attention. As the abovementioned doctor put it:

> . . . There are the professional fakers who just refuse to work. These people wanted to speculate in consumers' goods. To this category of patients we would be, of course, quite strict. They wanted to earn money for themselves and deceived the doctor.[28]

But not all cases were of this type. As one interviewed physician said:

> How do you think we felt when women came to us begging, crying, "Comrade doctor, give me just one day off, I want to go to my mother's in the village and get some food for my starving children."[29]

When physicians are law in evaluating claims for medical excuses, the authorities may impose such norms as temperature minima to automatically sift "sick" from "healthy" patients in disregard of the fact that many illnesses are not accompanied by a rise or fall in body temperature. Or the physician may be limited to an absolute quota—*i.e.,* a percentage of the total individuals assigned to him—in granting sickness excuses over a stated period of time. To go beyond this figure would be to court trouble.

In line with certain liberalizing trends in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death, some of the more obnoxious elements of the labor discipline laws were repealed, and there has followed a gradual but noticeable rise in the standard of living of the population. To some extent these developments have eased the pressure upon the Soviet doctor, but basic problems remain.

The Doctor's Dilemma

THAT there is a continuing conflict between the physician's humanitarian impulses and the role the regime expects him to play is clearly revealed in the Soviet press. Doctors frequently are condemned for excessive goodness of heart, gullibility, indifference or irresponsibility. As evidence the papers charge that

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[24] *Spravochnik administrativno-khozyaistvenovo rabotnika mediko-sanitarnikh uchrezhdenii* [Handbook of the Administrative-Economic Worker in Medical-Sanitary Institutions], Moscow, 1950, Order No. 116, Article 7, p. 337.

[25] "On the Subject of the Clinical Bases of the Institute," *Meditsinsky rabotnik,* July 31, 1955, p. 4.

[26] For a complete discussion of the latest developments in Soviet labor law, particularly as they affect sick leaves and disability compensation, see Jerzy Gliksman, "Recent Trends in Soviet Labor Law," *Problems of Communism,* No. 4, Vol. 5 (July-August), 1956.

[27] *Protocols,* No. 1379, pp. 29-30; also No. 607, pp. 24-5.

[28] *Ibid.,* No. 1379, p. 31.

[29] *Ibid.,* No. 1800, p. 4.

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HISTORY OF AN ILLNESS

—The doctor flatly refused to give my husband a medical certificate, and it upset him so much that he became ill!

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), March 20, 1951.

people with certificates of illness sometimes claiming them to be at "death's door," are seen going about in perfect health, not only enjoying their time off but occasionally using it to earn money. For example, *Trud* criticized doctors in Drogobych Province for "an unusualy frivolous attitude toward the issuance of bulletins. A person only has to put a suffering expression on his face to be relieved from work." [30] "It is time to make clear to soft-hearted doctors," a follow-up article concluded, "that their excessive kindness (more correctly their irresponsibility in granting sick leaves) costs a great deal." [31]

* * *

The Soviet physician thus may be said to play the role of a cushioning device between the demands of a totalitarian regime and the population, a sort of haven of refuge, a last resort against oppressive discipline. Through the "magic" sickness certificate, leave can be obtained, rest can be won from over-zealous industrial managers, changes of assignments can be justified. While this imposes an undoubtedly heavy burden on the physician—and one not without its dangers—it still may give him the satisfaction of "helping" people, although the help is not strictly "medical".

The social role of the physician thus becomes part and parcel of the system of informal "adjustive mechanisms" which is found in most societies and which makes life more tolerable for the individual. As the noted German pathologist, Rudolf Virchow, wrote more than one hundred years ago, "physicians are the natural attorneys of the poor, and social problems fall to a large extent within their jurisdiction." [32] More recently, Elinor Lipper, who spent some eleven years in a Soviet concentration camp, reported that one physician told her: "Camps are made to tighten the screws on the prisoners, and we doctors are here to loosen them a bit." [33]

If, as some recent developments seem to foreshadow, the present Soviet leadership should find it expedient to place greater emphasis on incentives rather than coercion, perhaps the pressures and extra-medical demands on the Soviet doctor will correspondingly decrease, and he will be able to devote more time and energy to medical problems. To the extent that the Soviet system remains basically unchanged, however, the doctor will continue to face the three-pronged dilemma posed by his unwelcome civic responsibility as an enforcer of labor discipline, his professional responsibility as a healer of the sick, and his social responsibility as an agent for "loosening" the screws on an overtaxed, over-pressured population.

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30 "Once More About Good Fellows," *Trud,* April 7, 1955.

31 Editorial in *Trud* entitled "The Sick Leave," April 8, 1955.

32 Quoted in Henry E. Sigerist, *Medicine and Human Welfare,* New Haven: Yale University Press 1941, p. 93.

33 *Onze ans dans les bagnes soviétiques* (Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps), Paris: Nagel Press, 1950, p. 218.

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Communism and French Labor

Part I: The Historical Background

By MICHEL COLLINET

EDITORS' NOTE: *One of the essential foundations of the exceptionally strong political influence wielded by the Communist Party in postwar France and Italy has been the dominant Communist position of leadership in the trade union movement. In France, this phenomenon is partly the result of special circumstances which developed during World War II, but it has deeper historical roots in the prewar period and, particularly, in the early revolutionary orientation of French syndicalism. The present article reviews the highlights of this historical background, while Part II, to appear in the next issue, will discuss the subsequent development from 1940 to the present, including an analysis of the unprecedentedly sharp challenge facing the Communist leadership of French labor as a result of the post-20th CPSU Congress crisis in world communism and events in Hungary.*

THE most casual observer today cannot fail to be struck by the fact that France and Italy are the sole countries of the European democratic bloc where there exists a strong labor movement obedient to Communist leadership. Elsewhere outside the Soviet orbit, Communist influence in the labor unions either is non-existent or represents such a small minority that it is forced to hide behind an outwardly apolitical facade of traditional trade unionism. In France, by contrast, the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), which owes official allegiance to the Soviet-directed World Federation of Trade Unions, is the dominant force in the labor field. Despite the loss of its virtual monopoly position of the early postwar years, and despite the unprecedentedly sharp impact of recent events in Hungary, the CGT probably continues to command the support of the majority of French organized labor, outweighing in influence the various non-Communist labor organizations.[1]

[1] In a number of factory committee elections held since the Soviet armed intervention in Hungary, the vote for GGT candidates showed declines of 15 to 40 percent, with corresponding gains for the rival labor organizations.

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The Communists achieved a dominant position in the French labor movement only after World War II, but some Communist influence has made itself felt among the workers ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Between the wars, that influence fluctuated widely, reaching its highest points in two periods—the first in the early 1920's, when the Communists rent asunder the original CGT to form the rival CGTU (Unitary General Confederation of Labor), and the second in the Popular Front era of the latter 1930's, which saw the Communists return to the CGT and nearly gain control of it from within by 1939 and the outbreak of the second world conflagration.

Thus, as a consequence of unceasing Communist efforts to achieve labor mastery, the French labor movement has been kept in a perpetual state of actual or potential split for more than three and a half decades. No analogous situation has characterized the labor movement of any other European country except Italy: even in Germany under the Weimar Republic, the powerful Communist Party did not succeed in gaining control of organized labor, or in substantially splitting its ranks. This difference is traceable, in part, to the particular course of overall political developments in France, but it is also explained in no small measure by the special ideological orientation of the French labor movement in its formative years.

The Philosophy of Syndicalism

THE workers' movement in France during the last quarter of the nineteenth century differed from its counterparts in the neighboring industrialized countries in that it was strongly influenced by Anarchist concepts. In Germany the trade unions were actually controlled by the Social Democratic Party; in Belgium and the Scandinavian countries the unions organized labor parties primarily to promote universal suffrage; in Britain the Labor Party was formed by the trade unions with the same reformist objective. In France, on the contrary, the trade unions generally spurned the Socialist parties, which lacked unity and were inclined to dissipate their energies in esoteric controversies. If not

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opposed outright to universal suffrage and parliamentary action, French trade union leaders were at the least skeptical of their effectiveness in promoting working-class goals. Disinterested in legislative measures, they instead placed their faith in "direct action" by the wage earners against industrial management and saw in every strike, however unimportant, an opportunity to train the workers for the revolutionary general strike which would, in their belief, bring about the overthrow of capitalist ownership and the "bourgeois" state. They also rejected national solidarity in favor of uncompromising internationalism and made the struggle against militarism and war a basic element of their social program.

French revolutionary syndicalism differed in another important respect. Its exponents never aimed at organizing the mass of the workers, but preferred quality to numbers. They believed that history is made, not by huge battalions, but by "active minorities"; and they considered the labor groups under their leadership as communities of ideas and action rather than as organs of the workers' material welfare. While the trade unions in other industrialized countries developed mutual aid and cooperative effort with a view to expanding their membership, in France their main action was centered upon promoting strike movements. The result of this activist approach and de-emphasis of numerical strength was that the CGT, which had come into existence in 1895, by 1914 boasted a total membership of less than 400,000—almost exclusively skilled workers whose special qualifications, in a period of economic boom, assured them of a good measure of personal independence and freedom of employment.

The individualistic, libertarian outlook of the syndicalists was reflected in the loose federal structure of the CGT, best expressed by the formula of "free local unions within a free national federation; and free national federations within the CGT." Each local union belonged to the national federation for its own particular industry or trade, and at the same time to a *bourse du travail* horizontally linking together the unions of different industries at the local or *département* (district) level. Both the latter groupings enjoyed complete autonomy within the over-all framework of the CGT. Between plenary confederal congresses, the National Confederal Committee (CCN), on which the representation of the local unions was three times that of the national federations, functioned as the CGT parliament.[2]

At its Amiens Congress in 1906, the CGT adopted a highly flexible "Charter" which affirmed its independence from all political parties. This affirmation embodied the guiding syndicalist principle that trade unionism not only is self-sufficient but contains the answer to all social needs. In opposition to all other schools of socialist thought, the Charter declared that the task of carrying out the proletarian revolution belonged exclusively to the trade unions, and that, after the overthrow of the capitalist state, they would become the directing organs of the new society.

Such, in brief summary, was the purely empirical doctrine of French revolutionary syndicalism, which consciously and voluntarily divorced itself from political democracy and the nation-state.

The Impact of War and Revolution

BY releasing a flood tide of nationalism that submerged the imperfectly developed supra-national class consciousness of the workers, World War I caused the virtual collapse of syndicalism as the rallying force of the French labor movement. The collapse, however, was made easier by developments which already had impaired the strength and solidarity of the trade unions in the years preceding the outbreak of war. In particular, the introduction of the scientific industrial methods of Taylorism, which had as its primary effects an increased rate of production coupled with lowered piecework wages, had produced a further consequence of much deeper social significance—the systematic replacement of skilled by unskilled labor. The advent of this new proletariat, lacking in professional pride and ignorant of trade union traditions, did more than merely deprive the unions of the class of workers which hitherto had supplied the backbone of their strength; it also undermined the doctrinal foundations of syndicalism, which saw in the individual worker's sense of "the nobility of his profession" the very cornerstone of the revolutionary ideal.[3]

In addition to these factors, the dominance of syndicalist ideas in the CGT was increasingly challenged during this period by the rise within the trade unions of rival tendencies in violent opposition to one another—anarchism, the "positivism" of the followers of Auguste Comte, and the Marxism of Jules Guesde, who sought to bring the trade unions under the Socialist party banner. Indicative of this ferment of ideas and the accompanying dilution of orthodox syndicalism, Griffulhes, a former secretary of the CGT, went so far

[2] At CGT congresses each local union was entitled to one vote regardless of the size of its membership.

[3] The dismayed reaction of the French trade union leaders to this change was expressed by A. Merrheim, secretary of the metalworkers' federation, who wrote (*La Vie Ouvrière,* March 1913) that "Intelligence has been driven out of the workshops and factories."

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as to write, in 1911, that "a busy and active capitalism is necessary to the growth and elevation of the working class." [4]

With the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, revolutionary syndicalism further crumbled. An overwhelming majority of trade union leaders, headed by Leon Jouhaux, rallied to the national defense and took an active part in the industrial agencies set up by the government to expand war production. Only a small minority, whose leaders were A. Merrheim, secretary of the metalworkers' federation, and Pierre Monatte, editor of the trade union newspaper *La Vie Ouvrière,* sought to keep alive the old revolutionary ideals. Merrheim participated in the Zimmerwald conference of 1915, at which Lenin urged the creation of a new proletarian international to hasten the overthrow of capitalism through the tactic of "revolutionary defeatism," and the group also maintained close contact with Trotsky, then exiled in France.

With the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917, the smoldering embers of the old revolutionary, internationalist philosophy which had once dominated the CGT again sprang into flame, challenging the reformist, patriotic policies of the wartime confederal leadership. The Russian Communists emerged in the eyes of the revolutionary elements as the standard bearers of their own suppressed libertarian and anti-militarist ideals; and the early Russian Soviets, which enjoyed a large measure of individual autonomy and independence from central authority, were hailed as a practical realization of the syndicalist ideal—a workers' society organized along the same federalist lines as the CGT. French trade unionists viewed the Soviets as a counterpart to the *bourses du travail,* which the Amiens Charter had conceived as the future local organs of working-class self-government.

At the same time, the action of Lenin and Trotsky in repudiating Russia's military alliances and proposing peace to both belligerent camps appealed to the resurgent anti-militarism in trade union ranks. Last but not least, the French revolutionaries found an echo of their own traditional opposition to parliaments in the Bolsheviks' dissolution of the Constituent Assembly barely after it had convened, and they likened Lenin's concept of the Communist Party as the directing vanguard of the proletariat to the syndicalist idea of the trade unions as "active minorities" leading the working masses along the path of revolution.

[4] Quoted from an article entitled, "Working-class Activity is Linked to National Activity," in the CGT daily organ, *La Bataille Syndicaliste,* June 13, 1911.

The Deception of French Labor

IN singling out these supposed affinities, the left-wing French trade unionists were obviously influenced by Leninist ideas as expressed in *The State and Revolution* rather than by the actual practice of the Bolshevik dictatorship, of which they knew little. In particular, they were unaware that the Russian trade unions, far from lending significant support to the Bolshevik seizure of power, had sometimes acted in opposition to it. Lozovsky, the future secretary of the Red International of Trade Unions, or Profintern, was thus able to mislead the French trade unions by stating:

The trade unions of Russia did not merely help the Revolution; they *made* it. They were one of the most important factors in the victory of the proletariat.[5]

Lozovsky's entire message, addressed to the French unions in a bid for their support, obviously sought to conceal both the military role of the Bolshevik Party in imposing the Revolution, and its dominating political position.

The Bolshevik appeal to French labor was further pressed by Trotsky, whose former connections with the revolutionary trade unionists in Paris made him well aware of their moods and concepts. In his *Letter to a French Syndicalist,* he set out to forge a theoretical link between Leninism and the theses of the Amiens Charter, arguing that the sole difference between the Communist Party in Russia and the "active minority" of the syndicalists was one simply of name! He further asserted that the vaunted syndicalist weapon of the general strike was inadequate if not coordinated with a Communist-directed armed uprising. And whereas the French revolutionaries adhered to the Proudhonist principle that "the workshop shall abolish the state," Trotsky declared that Proudhon's ideal was unattainable without Communist Party intervention.[6]

The primary objective of the Bolshevik propaganda effort of 1920 toward French labor was not so much to overcome opposition to a revolutionary course as to conquer the traditional reluctance of the trade unions to subordinate the labor movement to an outside political party. Hence, the Leninist concept of a centralized party along Jacobin lines, which had been formulated in 1903, was carefully concealed, and the actual subjection of Russian labor to the Communist Party's dictatorship was camouflaged in the fictitious garb of "Soviet democracy." In curious contrast to this external propaganda, however, the theses adopted by the Second Comintern Congress in 1920 clearly stated:

. . . the Communists must strive to create as far as possible

[5] *Bulletin Communiste,* Paris, October 7, 1920.

[6] *Ibid.,* December 2, 1920.

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complete unity between the trade unions and the Communist Party, and *to subordinate the unions to the leadership of the party* as the advanced guard of the workers' revolution. For this purpose the Communists should form party fractions in all the trade unions and factory committees and, with their help, *take over control and leadership of the trade union movement.*[7]

The principle of absolute party control, so assiduously played down in the appeals to French labor, was further underlined by the 1920 theses in these words:

The work of the Soviets as well as of the trade unions, once they have taken on a revolutionary character, must invariably and systematically be directed by the party of the proletariat, that is, by the Communist Party.[8]

These revealing pronouncements should have opened the eyes of the vast majority of French trade unionists who remained faithful to the principles of the Amiens Charter. That no such awakening took place must be attributed, in large measure, to the atmosphere of tension and hope created in postwar France by the 1919 uprisings in Central Europe and by the outbreak of revolutionary strikes in Italy. These developments all were credited to Bolshevism by its supporters, as well as by its adversaries, and amidst the prevailing fever of revolutionary enthusiasm—tinged by a romanticism inherited from the preceding century—the true organic nature of Leninism as an implacable system of party domination was lost from view.

The Scission in Labor Ranks

THE currents of unrest sweeping through the ranks of French labor had prompt repercussions in the CGT. A mass influx of recruits imbued with the new revolutionary spirit of resentment and hope swelled trade union membership fivefold, bolstering the strength of the hitherto heavily outnumbered left-wing elements in the CGT to a level almost equal to that of the controlling Jouhaux faction. A split thus became inevitable between the two rival camps; on the one hand, the reformists under Jouhaux, now supported by the former dissenters, Merrheim and Dumoulin, stood for a postwar policy of gradualism aimed at the creation of a nationalized economy and integrating trade unionism within the framework of a democratic state; on the other, the left-wing faction, centered around the old anarchist and revolutionary syndicalist minorities and supported from the outside by the Russian and European Communist Parties, placed their faith in a future revolution of the Soviet type.

At the session of the National Confederal Committee in September 1921, a decisive struggle for power developed. Again defeated by the Jouhaux forces, the revolutionary faction demanded the convocation of an extraordinary congress of the CGT, and when the demand was rejected, it seceded in December 1921 to form the CGTU, or Unitary General Confederation of Labor.

The formation of the CGTU, however, did not represent a total Communist victory. For one thing, the Comintern had not concealed its preference for gaining control of the old CGT from within rather than splitting labor by the establishment of a separate organization.[9] Moreover, the CGTU itself was not initially dominated by the Communists, but by Anarchists whose attitude toward the Soviet regime became one of hostility as they became increasingly aware of its reliance upon military force and its dictatorial character. With the suppression of the Russian Anarchists and the bloody stamping out of the Ukrainian and Kronstadt uprisings, the CGTU found itself threatened by an open rupture in its own ranks, the Comintern stepping in with an effort to divide the anti-Communist opposition by means of highly flexible tactics and by concessions which eventually proved of little real value.

Meanwhile, the Comintern's directives calling for Communist conquest of the trade unions had encountered strong opposition even in the French Communist Party. At its first congress at Marseilles in November 1921, attended by a number of former Anarchists and revolutionary syndicalists, a majority of the party refused to sanction an attempt to gain complete control of the unions and contented itself with a policy of "circumstantial" agreements, which appeared in closer accord with the views of Jaurès and Vaillant than of Lenin and Zinoviev.

In line with this policy, the CGTU congress at St.-Etienne reaffirmed its adherence to the Amiens Charter and recognized the principle of autonomous trade unionism provided that it did not claim "to satisfy all needs." Notable among those opposing the formation of party cells within the unions at this time was Pierre Semard who later, as party secretary, was to bow to Comintern

[7] *Manifestes, Thèses et Résolutions adoptées par les quatre premiers Congrès de l'Internationale communiste* (1919-1923), Librairie du Travail, Paris, June 1934, pp. 54-5. (English text quoted in Jane Degras, *The Communist International, 1919-43*, Vol. I, Oxford Press, London-New York, 1956.)

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[9] Lenin wrote at this time, "It is necessary to be able . . . to agree to any and every sacrifice, and even—if need be—to resort to all sorts of stratagems, maneuvers and illegal methods, to evasions and subterfuges, in order to penetrate the trade unions, to remain in them, and to carry on Communist work in them at all costs." "Left-wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder," *Selected Works*, International Publishers, New York, 1938, Vol. X, p. 95.

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pressure and throw both syndicalists and Trotskyites out of the party.[10]

In 1923 the new flexible tactics of the Communists at last scored an important success in the CGTU, which decided to affiliate itself with the Moscow Profintern while still continuing to reject any direct and permanent link with the French Communist Party. This ingenious compromise maneuver, initiated by the former trade unionist leader, Monmousseau, who had become an unofficial member of the French party Politburo, succeeded in averting a premature break with the Anarchists and at the same time made the CGTU subservient to the directing center of party leadership in the Communist International, of which the Profintern was only a subsidiary organ.

The Period of Bolshevization

THE following year (1924) brought a marked stiffening of Moscow policy, which now demanded full "bolshevization" of the Communist movements in other countries strictly after the Soviet pattern. Trade union leaders who had been among the founders of French communism but now proved too intractable were expelled from the party. At the same time, the Anarchists and old syndicalist cadres either quit the CGTU or found themselves reduced there to a powerless minority subjected to constant and overwhelming pressure from the party organs.[11]

Having gained undisputed control of the CGTU leadership, the Communists proceeded to consolidate their grip on the lower levels of trade union organization. The former officials of the unions affiliated with the CGTU were replaced by a new generation of leaders trained after the war in Leninist schools.[12] The old trade union structure inherited from the CGT, which stressed the principle of autonomy, was thoroughly reorganized along centralized lines designed to uproot every vestige of independent union spirit; the multitude of local unions was supplanted by a network of regional units directed by Communist Party officials, and the *département*-level organization was similarly revamped to parallel that of the national CP. To the party factions in the unions were now added Communist cells in industrial enterprises; these cells organized party sympathizers at the workshop level and thus contested the authority of the unions in their own proper sphere of activity, which the party sought to "politicize."

The process of "bolshevization" reached its culmination in 1929, when the CGTU Congress formally incorporated recognition of the directing control of the Communist Party in its constitution and Marcel Cachin took the congress floor to proclaim the "death" of anarcho-syndicalism. The party's victory, however, cost the CGTU heavily in terms of its following among the workers. The total membership of CGTU-affiliated unions fell from 500,000 in 1925 to less than 200,000 in 1935. Of the 200,000 metalworkers in the Paris region, for example, only 2,500—all Communists—belonged to the CGTU affiliate during the 1930-34 period.

Despite the general exodus of revolutionary syndicalists from the CGTU, a few still remained, mostly in the teaching profession and among the stevedores, dockers and food industry workers. These elements, alienated by the Communist seizure of the CGTU but also opposed to the reformist policies of the CGT under Jouhaux joined forces with left-wing dissidents in the CGT to work for a reunified trade union organization based on the Amiens Charter and freed from Communist subservience.[13]

The subservience of the CGTU to Moscow policy had become clearly evident after the mid-1920's in its slavish observance of the most subtle shifts in the international Communist line. In 1926-27, when this line was conditioned by the Soviet desire to woo British labor, the CGTU pursued a conciliatory policy calling for labor unity. During the ensuing period of "bolshevization," 1929-35, it just as assiduously obeyed Stalin's orders for all-out, uncompromising war against social democracy and persistently tried to destroy the CGT despite the fact that this policy only resulted in increasing defections from its own ranks to those of the CGT.

The Period of the Popular Front

The next kaleidoscopic shift in Moscow policy came in 1935, when Stalin instituted efforts for a rapprochement with the Western democracies in the face of the

[10] On the intra-party discussions which took place on this issue both leading up to and at the party congress, see *Bulletin Communiste,* June 16, September 1, and November 11, 1921.

[11] These elements, after leaving the CGT, founded the Revolutionary Syndicalist General Confederation of Labor (CGTSR). Reestablished in 1946 under the name of the National Confederation of Labor, the organization failed to attract any significant following.

[12] Among the new leaders who arose during this period were Francois Billoux, at present a secretary of the French CP Central Committee, and Ambroise Croizat, who served as Communist Minister of Labor after World War II, 1945-47.

[13] Two organizations through which this work was carried on were the Syndicalist League and the so-called "Committee of 22". The latter, organized in November 1930, was composed of eight members from the CGTU, seven from the CGT, and seven from the independent trade unions.

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Nazi threat to the USSR. In line with the new "popular front" tactics directed by the Comintern to implement this policy, the CGTU—now greatly reduced in strength —negotiated its own reunification with the CGT. The reunification agreement concluded in 1936 was highly favorable to the Communist-dominated CGTU: while it barred—at least in theory—the maintenance of Communist factions in the trade unions, the CGTU obtained, as a *quid pro quo* for this concession, "parity of leadership" with the CGT in the reunified unions and labor federations. The effect of this important stipulation was to give the Communist officials from the CGTU an equal place in the leadership even of unions where the ex-CGTU members constituted but a factional minority.

Thus, in the reunited CGT with its one million members, the Communists obtained excellent springboard positions for a new effort to expand their influence. Moreover, they enjoyed an important advantage which the trade unions lacked: The unions, because of the blindly hostile attitude of industrial management and their own tactical mistakes, had not been able to organize the workers of individual enterprises or plants on a company basis, but only on a local geographic basis, with the workers allowed to join the local unions only as individuals. This meant that the unions lacked a foothold inside the plants, whereas the Communists could rely upon the action of the clandestine cells which they had organized in the factories and which had gained strength and experience in the years of political agitation prior to 1936.

The sudden wave of stay-in strikes which broke out in that year brought the Communist advantage into full play. The striking workers, who occupied the factories, were largely unorganized and without any previous union affiliation, and they naturally sought on-the-spot leadership which only the Communist cells were in a position to provide. Thanks to this golden opportunity, the Communists were able to bring some four million hitherto unaffiliated workers into newly-organized unions under their own leadership. As a typical example, aggregate union membership among the metalworkers of the Paris region rose from 10,000 to 200,000 inside of two months, with 90 percent of the augmented membership supporting the Communists electorally.

For the first time, the Communists now had at their disposal organized mass support in the trade unions. They promptly took advantage of their newfound strength to upset the parity principle of the 1936 agreement, gradually eliminating their socialist or independent syndicalist rivals from the leaderships of the national labor federations and the *département*-level organizations of the CGT, or sometimes keeping them in their positions but reducing them to the status of hostages able to act only under strict party control.

The effect of such subversive and discriminatory tactics, carried on by the Communists under the banner of the popular front, was to make the trade unions again the arena of fierce political controversy, leading to new defections from CGT ranks. Within a single year, 3,000 out of a total of 18,000 unions left the reunited CGT. Simultaneously with these losses, however, the Communists were tightening their grip on the local union leaderships to such an extent that they probably would have controlled the scheduled 1940 Congress of the CGT if the outbreak of World War II had not intervened. The war abruptly terminated the second period of flourishing Communist influence in the French trade unions, for the Communists refused to support the war effort against a Germany toward which the Soviet Union at the outset was benevolently neutral. As the penalty for this new act of subservience, they were expelled from the CGT and driven underground.

* * *

The twenty-year history of the rise of Communist influence in the French labor movement up to World War II thus sheds light upon vital aspects of the background against which the even greater upsurge of that influence in the post-1945 period has occurred. It illustrates how the Communists, in their systematic and determined efforts to crush the sway of revolutionary syndicalism, were able to exploit to their own advantage certain basic elements of the syndicalist philosophy—its belief in direct action and its hostility toward political democracy and toward the state considered as the protective bulwark of bourgeois dominance. The subjugation of syndicalism, however, also proved to mean the replacement of its emphasis on individual liberty and trade union autonomy by submission to the bureaucratic discipline of the Communist Party, itself the servant of Soviet purposes.

In their efforts to destroy syndicalism, the Communists were aided by a still more basic factor: the process of industrial evolution which, by substituting unskilled, mechanized labor for the skilled craftsmen who were the backbone of the old trade unions, undermined the whole social basis of revolutionary syndicalist doctrine. To the technical subordination of the worker in the factories, however, communism only added his ideological subordination to the party.

The French syndicalist tradition, in short, proved unable to adjust itself to the modern phenomenon of mechanized labor, making possible the effective exercise of the Pavlovian methods of the Communist Party.

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The Indian CP and Neo-Maoist Strategy

John H. Kautsky:
Moscow and the Communist Party of India
Technological Press and John Wiley and Sons,
New York, 1956, 202 pp.

M. R. Masani:
The Communist Party of India,
Macmillan, New York, 1954, 251 pp.

Reviewed by Selig S. Harrison

JAWAHARLAL Nehru once called the Indian Communist Party "the most stupid among the Communist parties of the world." When the party seemed about to fall apart in 1949, one of its stalwarts, P. C. Joshi, cried out that "victory in China is the glory of world communism; the collapse of the Indian Communist its shame." And Minoo Masani's book, with its recital of the CPI's misfortunes, inspired a reviewer in *The Times of India* to exclaim: "What a faint shadow of the great Communist parties of the world is the Communist Party of India!"

To date the record is indeed a sorry one, but in the volcanic Indian political landscape, what of the future? Unforeseen events within India could conceivably bring to the fore new Communist leadership confronted with quite new opportunities. Therefore, for all its aspects of futility, the record of Indian Communist experience merits the most careful consideration. Three years ago Masani published his pioneer chronicle of the party's history from its very beginning. In 1956 John Kautsky examined the Indian Communist line within a more limited time span, 1945 to 1954, as a case study in the nature of international Communist relationships. We are fortunate in having two such excellent books, complementing each other as they do, on this most vital subject.

Kautsky traces with great acuity the rise of a distinctly new Communist strategy for the economically less developed regions. He points to the internal struggles within the CPI as reflections of a larger struggle within the international Communist movement. On the one hand there were the familiar strategies of the extreme left and the extreme right. Against these "orthodox" strategies was ranged the formidable challenge of the new "neo-Maoism", which was to become the operative strategy of Indian communism and, finally, of Communist parties throughout the less developed areas of the world.

In Kautsky's definition, neo-Maoism calls for Communist parties to make the same multi-class national appeal as did the Chinese Communists—but without necessarily imitating the pattern of Mao's Red Army revolt. The new strategy holds that armed struggle may not be necessary in other economically less developed areas; the local situation would dictate in each instance. In any case, Kautsky maintains, violence has little to do with the distinction between neo-Maoism and either the left strategy, which considers capitalism its undeviating enemy, or the right strategy, which espouses the policy of the "united front from above" with the leaders of other parties. The distinguishing element in neo-Maoism is "its direct appeal 'from below,' that is, not through bourgeois parties, to sections of the bourgeoisie."

With a combination of classes thus enabled to join together against the common foreign enemy, Western imperialism, the neo-Maoist strategy is clearly suited to serve the interests of Soviet foreign policy. "In brief," declares Kautsky, "the cold war has taken the place of the class struggle." Neo-Maoism thus distorts Marxism almost beyond recognition. At the same time, it is a logical consequence of the Leninist theory that imperialism is a phenomenon peculiar to a certain stage of capitalism, a theory which, as Benjamin Schwartz earlier remarked, became "the binding link between Marxism-Leninism and Asiatic resentments."

In his first chapter Kautsky schematically classifies the salient features of each Communist strategy. He cites as a basic text Mao's report to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in December 1947, in which Mao said:

> **Wherever the state power of the New Democracy reaches, these classes [the petty and middle bourgeoisie] must be firmly and unhesitatingly protected. All that the New Democratic Revolution aims to eliminate are feudalism and monopoly capitalism, the landlord class and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, not capitalism in general nor the petty or middle bourgeoisie.**

As one of the milestones leading to the final triumph of the neo-Maoist strategy in India, Kautsky dwells

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first upon the 1947 sessions of the USSR Academy of Sciences. At that point the left and neo-Maoist strategies co-existed in Moscow, and the Soviet Union was so preoccupied with emerging postwar European problems that it was "apparently not sufficiently interested in India to bother to formulate . . . a party line for the Indian Communists." For their part, the Indian Communists were still swearing their love for Nehru as a "progressive" when Zhdanov made his report to the Cominform meeting in September 1947, with its classic statement of the two-camp doctrine and its sharp break with the right strategy.

Although it was widely assumed that the Zhdanov line heralded a return to the left strategy, Kautsky points out that for all his anti-imperialist verbiage, Zhdanov was never expressly anti-bourgeois; in fact he seems to have deliberately opened the door to neo-Maoism. "Men steeped in the 'left' tradition of communism and eager to return to it," he writes, could nonetheless "easily overlook [Zhdanov's] essential neo-Maoist message in the mass of radical language." Balchand Ranadive, then chafing under the leadership of P.C. Joshi, was such a Communist. The militant pronouncements at the Communist-front Southeast Asia Youth Conference in Calcutta in February, 1948, were enough to persuade Ranadive and his allies in the CPI that the Zhdanov line did indeed envisage a total swing back to the Left strategy in India. The Second CPI Congress, immediately following the Youth Conference, ratified the switch to the new line, ousted Joshi, and confirmed Ranadive's rise to power.

The insurrectionist tactics which followed were not, necessarily, however, what Moscow had in mind. During the June, 1949, session of the USSR Academy of Sciences the Moscow line swung over finally to neo-Maoism. Soviet Indologist V. V. Balabushevich, last holdout against the new line, conceded that "individual groupings" in the ranks of local capitalists can conceivably "become fellow travelers with the democratic forces in their struggle against imperialism and its allies."

But while Moscow was moving in this direction, the Indian Communists under Ranadive's leadership continued to base their actions on the left assumption that the driving force of the revolution, the urban and rural proletariat, must carry on unrelenting violent struggle in which even the poor and middle peasants and the petty bourgeoisie could be regarded as vacillating allies at best. Ranadive waged bitter ideological warfare in the party press against the Andhra Communist Committee, leading neo-Maoists within the CPI. Indeed, supremely confident, he proceeded to strike out against Mao himself, charging him with "Horrifying formulations . . . such that no Communist party can accept . . . in contradiction to the world understanding of the Communist parties."

Although Ranadive's tactics met with growing dissatisfaction among many of the top leaders of the CPI, they also felt themselves increasingly impotent to unseat him. On January 13, 1950, as a desperate last resort, Joshi published his "Letter to Foreign Comrades." "International communism must intervene," he pleaded in an open appeal for Soviet support. "It is you from abroad who have to act and act quickly." Intervention in the form of an editorial in the Cominform journal followed promptly (January 27). The article stated that "the task of the Indian Communists . . . is to unite all classes, parties, groups and organizations willing to defend the national independence and freedom of India"

The CPI membership took the hint. Ranadive made way for Rajeshwar Rao of Andhra, and the Central Committee's new program—"a thoroughly neo-Maoist document," writes Kautsky—said flatly in April 1951 that the CPI seeks only to build "a coalition of all democratic anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces." When Rao balked on some of the finer points of the new line, he was replaced by Ajoy K. Ghosh, who remains the CPI General Secretary to this day.

Kautsky presents these convolutions of Indian communism with painstaking precision, assuring his work a place as a major reference source in the field of Indian and international communism. His impressive documentation utilizes German primary sources, English translations of Soviet writings, and English-language Indian Communist documents available in the United States. It is inevitable, however, and it is no reflection upon him, that a job of library research would lack insights that field research alone could have provided. At times Kautsky speaks of Indian Communists and Indian communism with a certain wooden unreality. At the outset he states that:

> . . . one of the assumptions on which this study is based is that in the last analysis shifts in a Communist Party line are due to corresponding earlier shifts in Moscow and perhaps Peiping, rather than to the interpretation of Marxism and Leninism by local Communist leaders or the internal conditions of a given country.

While this may be a valid assumption in and of itself, it is a risky one to carry too far, for it can unnecessarily straitjacket the analyst. This writer doubts that it is wise to downgrade "internal conditions" so unreservedly in the name of methodology. To consider political developments within a doctrinal vacuum in the culturally distinctive Indian setting is especially inhibiting.

For example, without going behind the fact, Kautsky explains his choice of the CPI for his case study partly

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in terms of the English-language medium of its publications. "No other important Asian Communist Party," he writes, "draws up all its major documents in English." But English is the official language of Indian communism, as of India itself, because it is the only language through which disparate linguistic territories can carry on a common program. The weakness of the central Communist organization in linguistically segmented India is a fact of basic importance, yet Kautsky's readers might well assume that effectively centralized and unified Communist machinery does exist in India.

Kautsky is at his original best when he traces parallel and simultaneous developments in India, the Soviet Union and China. He gives ample support for his conclusion that Moscow's formulations have resulted from opportunistic concentration, as he puts it,

> . . . at one time on one particular area of the world, where a given strategy may be appropriate, and from lack of interest in and ignorance of other areas where the Communist parties are simply not expected to follow the general line.

IF long distance handicaps Kautsky's work, M. R. Masani's history of the Indian Communist Party may have been written from a vantage point too close to the subject. Masani was a founder of the Indian Socialist Party and speaks of Indian communism from long first-hand contact. Yet he attempted to prepare a scholarly historical work rather than a personal memoir, and the result seems to fall somewhere in between. While Mr. Masani's is a valuable and easily digested book, it is likely to be replaced in time by more comprehensive scholarly works, and one can only hope that Mr. Masani will expand upon this first work with more extensive personalized reminiscences of his years as a political activist.

In chronological progression Masani recounts seven major phases in Indian Communist history—the founding period up to 1929; "The Wilderness" from 1930-35; the prewar united front; World War II; the drift into Ranadive insurrectionism; the return to non-violent tactics; and the present parliamentary phase dating from the adoption of the 1951 Program prior to India's first general election. Masani's occasionally loose and somewhat polemical development of this chronology suffers by comparison with Kautsky's rigorously precise delineations of doctrinal nuances.

In his solid early chapters Masani draws upon a heretofore unpublished resume of Communist activities in India through 1933, prepared for the confidential use of the British regime's Home Ministry in India and obtained in Masani's Socialist days. These are sure to be the enduring definitive chapters. As for the remainder of Masani's narrative, it is notable for the effective manner in which Communist development is related to modern Indian history in general. Masani achieves a perspective absent from Kautsky's clinical dissection in which the Indian Communist line is almost totally disembodied from its environment.

At the same time Kautsky's probing analysis is more impressive than Masani's comparatively cursory recitation of Indian Communist history. Masani maintains in the closing pages of the book that the "literate middle class man" is Indian communism's basic raw material, but this compelling theme is offered almost as an afterthought.

Whereas Kautsky considers the transmission of directives from Moscow to local Communist parties largely in terms of open doctrinal pronunciamentos, Masani speaks instead of emissaries and intermediaries, emphasizing especially the semi-imperialist relationship between British Communist oracle Palme Dutt and the Indian Communists. As early as 1924, says Masani flatly, the Communist Party of Great Britain "tended to monopolize India as its own province." Palme Dutt became "the Pundit to lay down the line to the Indian party, a role he still plays." In the early pages of the book we learn of the aliases and codes which were the stock in trade of Dutt's contacts with the Indian party in the twenties; later of Indians "who managed to visit England under various pretexts, such as health or business," to get the word from Dutt. This is a legitimate emphasis on a significant aspect of Indian Communist relations with Moscow, and it typifies the vivid sense of the firsthand which is missing from Kautsky's stern scholarship.

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Destalinization: Motives and Consequences

Boris Meissner: *Das Ende des Stalin-Mythos*
(The End of the Stalin Myth),
Institute for European Politics and Economics,
Frankfort, 1956, 214 pp.

Reviewed by Immanuel Birnbaum

THE dramatic chain of events set off by the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet CP last February may in retrospect make that gathering one of the historic milestones of Communist development. Thus the German Society for Foreign Policy and its research institute in Bonn have performed a real service for German-speaking analysts in publishing under one cover all important documentary materials relevant to the Congress. The editor, a German jurist now attached to the Federal Republic's Embassy in Moscow, has had previous experience in compiling collections of this sort, among them a volume of treaty texts and public documents pertaining to the Moscow eastern pact system.

In the present volume major speeches at the Congress by Khrushchev, Shepilov, Suslov, Mikoyan and Zhukov are translated in their entirety from the Communist press; a speech by Malenkov appears in adequate excerpt. Khrushchev's famous attack on Stalin, delivered at a secret session of the Congress, is translated from the English text as it first appeared in *The New York Times*. Lenin's testament of 1922, cited in discussion of the Stalin myth, is also printed as an annex. Other documents include an excerpt from the Belgrade party paper *Borba,* reflecting the latter-day ideological rapprochement between the Soviet and Yugoslav wings of communism, and a reproduction of complete membership lists for all higher party organs of the Soviet Union and its constituent republics as of February 1956.

As a selective compilation of documents, the volume is thus to be recommended; however, a few reservations must be stated concerning the introductory comment by the editor. Mr. Meissner ranges over a wide scope of material with customary zeal. But the critical reader will note that some of his far-reaching interpretations of Congress documents could hardly come from the mind of a schooled historian. The author is inclined to give a political meaning to every development at the Congress, even those moves for which there were other obvious and rational motives. Furthermore he believes that he can say of any party functionary, from the top on down through lower ranks, whether he is a Khrushchev or a Malenkov man, a supporter of this or that tactical nuance of party policy. Very often these assertions are based on extraneous biographical information. Whoever served under Malenkov at some time in the past must, in Meissner's opinion, be considered a Malenkov adherent in all present-day situations. Whoever worked with Khrushchev twenty years ago in the Ukraine still must be his confidante today.

Such is often the case but certainly not always. Russians, Ukranians or Georgians are also people who can change their opinions, especially on isolated issues. Some may have gotten into offices whose chiefs they by no means admired unreservedly, or been forced to perform functions which did not correspond with their personal opinions. Meissner is too cautious to make the mistake of certain other German authors who treat the entire domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union as a constant battle between various leader cliques and ideological trends. But occasionally he does fall into this type of speculation, making assertions about group factions for which neither his ample material on personal history nor other available information offers sufficient data.

A second tendency which occasionally clouds Meissner's picture of events in Moscow is his over-estimate of purely ideological motives in the actions of present-day Soviet politicians. Although for a Lenin or a Bukharin theoretical insight may have been a decisive factor in practical political decisions, such motives surely play a much lesser role for a Bulganin, a Malenkov or a Mikoyan. No one will doubt that for Stalin's successors, too, profession of the Communist dogma is a matter of course. But very often they use theoretical arguments merely to justify *ex post facto* their political actions, concealing their real motives rather than clarifying them. These real motives are of a purely pragmatical, practical nature to a much greater degree than in the early period of Leninism. The profession of communism has for today's Soviet ministers no greater significance than the profession of Islam for a Turkish vizier of the nineteenth century, or membership in a Christian church for a minister in the German government of

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Bismarck's time. Whoever has had conversations with Communist believers of the cynicism of a Vishinsky, the business reports of a Bulganin or a Malenkov, must be aware of the weakening of the religious impulses of Marxist faith. The return from Stalin to Lenin effected at the Twentieth Congress did not represent a renewal of the old faith; it was simply a means to rationalize the abandonment of Stalinist dogma.

Meissner views the present leadership of the Soviet Union as a two-man rule by Khrushchev and Bulganin, who together control the party and state apparatus and who must maintain themselves against both a more reformist wing, represented by Malenkov, and another group, which wants to restore Stalinism led by Molotov. This view certainly has credible facets, but it probably simplifies the situation too greatly. Certain events have made it clear that Khrushchev and Bulganin cannot by any means unite the entire political power of their broad empire in their persons—that on the contrary, other members of the party Presidium who are less in the foreground remain strongly involved in the "collective leadership" of Soviet policy. The emergence of Suslov (chief of the foreign bureau of the party and former secretary of the Cominform office) in the question of relations with Yugoslavia, the delegation of Mikoyan for important foreign assignments from Helsingfors to Peiping, and the participation of Kaganovich and Pervukhin (and to a smaller degree Saburov) in important decisions on economic policy make the impression of a simple *duumvirate* appear too hasty. Of the two supposed bosses, by the way, Khrushchev is by far the more active, and it was he who delivered the most important speeches. But it is still an open question whether the member of the party Presidium who makes the most speeches and trips and who is the most ready to seize the initiative is also necessarily the only man in authority. There is no proof that he plays the decisive role either in conference with his colleagues or in the national consciousness.

Meissner correctly views the destruction of the Stalin myth as the local point of the 1956 Congress. To bring about a change in prevailing attitudes toward the Stalinist heritage was obviously the real purpose of the whole affair. But in his richly documented exposition he does not show clearly enough that the Congress was merely the conclusion of a development which began in 1953, not just with the death of Stalin but with the deposition of Beria and his police apparatus several months later. Though Soviet ideology stresses the transition from the leader cult to collective leadership as the most important change in the post-Stalin period, one should not forget concurrent diminution of police influence in the highest authorities of party and state, a factor which was at least equally significant and which probably will involve greater problems in the long run. There was little talk on this subject at the Congress, but for the Soviet peoples and the satellite nations it represents the most important change in internal power relationships of recent years.

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Gomulka and Polish National Communism:

A Brief Historical Sketch

AS the recognized champion of an autonomous and specifically "Polish way to socialism," the resurrected leader of Polish communism, Wladyslaw Gomulka, today seeks to steer his country along a hazardous middle-of-the-road course combining the preservation and further development of Poland's existing Communist socio-political structure with a real measure of independence from external Soviet domination. The bloodless "October revolution" of 1956, which swept him back into power, was thus a revolution within the Communist framework. No less than Tito, whose nationalist "heresy" he shared in defiance of the Kremlin, Gomulka remains faithful—as far as can be judged from present evidence—to the deeply-ingrained Communist convictions he has held since early manhood.

Subject to this limitation, Gomulka's return to power was nonetheless an historic event in the evolution of Polish communism. It marked the triumph of a "nationalist deviationism" that has been endemic in the party ranks since the very formation of the original Communist Party of Poland in 1918, but which gained its greatest impetus under Stalinist repression. Following the treacherous liquidation, in Moscow, of the leading Polish Communists, Stalin in 1938 ordered the dissolution of the party as an unreliable instrument of his policy. Consequently, when Germany attacked Poland in September 1939, many Polish Communists volunteered to defend their capitalistic motherland against Soviet Russia's ally under the Stalin-Hitler pact. Gomulka, then an obscure trade union official, was among them.

AFTER the Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland, Gomulka and his friend, Marian Spychalski, now Polish Defense Minister, refused to go to Moscow and, instead, remained in German-occupied territory, whence they appealed for Comintern support in organizing a Communist resistance movement against the Nazis on Polish soil. The appeal went unheeded, but the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 spurred the party remnants in Poland to reorganize, in 1942, as the Polish Workers' Party (PPR). Gomulka's election to the secretary-generalship by the PPR Central Committee in November 1943 evidently was without Soviet knowledge or concurrence because of ruptured communications with Moscow.

To remedy the extremely weak internal position of the PPR, Gomulka considered it essential to broaden its political base. He therefore made repeated attempts to reach an understanding with the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and other leftist groups, and even established some contacts with the Polish government-in-exile in London. In this line of strategy, Gomulka had the support of the so-called "native Communist" group in the party leadership, which included, beside himself, Spychalski, Wladyslaw Bienkowski, Wladyslaw Kowalski, Zenon Kliszko and Ignacy Loga-Sowinski—all men without Moscow training. The "natives" maintained that the weakness and political isolation of the PPR dictated a strategy of compromise, and that the party, in particular, must reject "Luxemburgist nihilism" in favor of a stand placing greater stress on Polish nationalism.[1]

On this basic policy issue, Gomulka and his supporters were opposed by the Moscow-trained group of Stalinists led by the former officer of the Soviet NKVD, Boleslaw Bierut. The tougher line of the "Muscovites" demanded that the party go it alone and shun any compromise with the other leftist groups, relying upon all-powerful Soviet support following Poland's "liberation" to place them in power over any opposition. The "Muscovites" accused the "natives" of being "radishes," that is, red outside but white inside, whereas they themselves were "beetroots"—red all the way through.

AFTER the establishment of the Communist-dominated Provisional Government, the two rival groups continued to compete for control of the party and state political apparatus. Gomulka remained in his commanding position as party secretary-general, concurrently becoming Vice-Premier and Minister of Recovered Territories; Spychalski became Defense Vice-Minister in charge of army political education; Kowalski headed the Communist youth movement; and Bienkowski the party's educational program.

From the beginning the "natives" tried to soften the harsh effects of the Soviet military occupation and restrict looting by the Red Army; to keep terrorism under control; to proceed cautiously with collectivization of the economy; and to achieve some sort of synthesis between Marxist doctrine, Bolshevik practice, and the democratic tradition of the Polish Socialists. The

[1] "Luxemburgist nihilism" was the deprecatory term applied by the "native Communists" to the strict Marxian internationalism of the pre-World War I Social Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, once headed by Rosa Luxemburg. The old Polish Socialist Party (PPS), on the other hand, had been strongly nationalist, and the opposition between the two viewpoints was carried over into the original Communist Party of Poland, formed in 1918 by a merger of the Social Democratic Party and the left-wing elements of the Socialist Party.

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new regime in Poland must be basically Communist, they maintained, but it need not necessarily be a slavish imitation of the Soviet model.

THIS emphasis upon a specifically "Polish way to socialism" did not mean that Gomulka and his followers were not loyal Communists fully dedicated to establishing the rule of the party. While their policies in the early years gave an impression of relative moderation, they were both uncompromising and unscrupulous when it came to crushing those who stood in the way of full Communist political mastery. The Polish Peasant Party, which was the chief center of resistance, was suppressed during Gomulka's leadership by methods of trickery and terroristic persecution that were fully in accord with Stalinist practice.

Indeed, while the nationalistic coloration of Gomulka's policies stemmed in part from sincere ideological convictions, it was also influenced, in part, by strategic considerations of facilitating the Communist seizure of power. Nor was the concept of a Polish road to socialism outwardly opposed, at this stage, by the Soviet leaders in Moscow, for they evidently calculated that tolerance of nationalistic slogans would help to weaken Polish popular opposition to communism during the crucial take-over period.

After effective political opposition had been silenced, however, Moscow's attitude underwent a sudden change. In the summer of 1947 the Cominform was established with the primary objective of tightening Soviet control over the nascent "People's Democracies." Gomulka himself played host at the inaugural conference of the nine participating Communist parties, but at the same time he could not help expressing some misgivings to his colleagues in the Polish Politburo concerning Moscow's apparent intention to enforce more strict and uniform compliance with Stalinist policy.

AT the Cominform conference, Gomulka indirectly pointed to one important element in these misgivings—the question of Poland's western frontier with Germany. Referring to the work of the Polish party in overcoming anti-Soviet feeling, he stated that "the principal lever is the question of the western territories and the knowledge that the Soviet Union helped Poland to settle its frontiers on the Oder and the Neisse."[2] In spite of its innocuous context, this statement implied a certain mistrust that the Soviet Union, should its future interests so dictate, might once more strike a bargain with Germany at Poland's expense.

Despite this ever-present threat, Gomulka continued to stress Polish autonomy in defiance of the new Cominform line. On June 3, 1948, only three weeks before the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute reached its climax with the Cominform denunciation of Tito, Gomulka again assailed the "Luxemburgist" tradition at a plenary session of the PPR Central Committee and expressly eulogized the Polish Socialists for their stand on the issue of national independence. He declared:

Both for the PPS and for the PPR the independence of Poland is a supreme consideration, to which all others are subordinated.[3]

FOLLOWING the break with Tito, the Stalinist wing of the party leadership, at a Central Committee meeting from August 31 to September 3, 1948, took Gomulka to task for his reiteration of the national independence theme at the June plenum. His past attempts to compromise with other parties and his emphasis on a "Polish way to socialism" were scornfully denounced; he was accused of favoring a conciliatory attitude toward Tito while taking a defiant stand *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union and trying to negotiate with Moscow on a level of equality; he was charged further with slowing down the tempo of collectivization. After a prolonged and bitter debate, the Politburo found Gomulka guilty of "nationalist deviation" and suspended him from his post as secretary-general. His formal removal from the Politburo followed shortly, though he remained on the Central Committee.

The latter body reopened deliberations on Gomulka's case in November 1949, after the forced merger of the PPR and PPS in the United Polish Workers' Party (PZPR) had been successfully consummated. This time he was charged with "lack of vigilance," with "tolerating spies" in his capacity as Minister of Recovered Territories, and with using Polish patriotism rather than party loyalty as a criterion for appointments. On top of these alleged offenses, he was accused of responsibility for the deaths of Marcel Nowotko and Pawel Finder, who had successively held the party secretary-generalship just prior to Gomulka's election. These charges were later revealed as pure fabrications by the testimony of Jozef Swiatlo, the Polish security official who defected to the West.

INSTEAD of meekly admitting his guilt, Gomulka defended himself courageously and even tried to counterattack. His "errors" in the realm of ideology had, after all, been shared to some extent by practically all his colleagues in the Polish party leadership, as well as by most of the party leaders in the other "People's Democracies." But his condemnation had obviously been decided beforehand: the Central Committee was merely acting out a morality play carefully contrived by the Stalinist faction, upon orders from Moscow, for the benefit of the rest of the party.

The essential facts were quite plain. Gomulka's concept of a "Polish way to socialism", which Moscow had tolerated during the take-over period for tactical reasons, had now become a fatal "nationalist deviation" in view of the new Kremlin line and the rupture with

[2] *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy,* Bucharest, November 10, 1947.

[3] Though not published at the time, this statement and other details of the June plenum were later brought out at the Central Committee session at the end of August and reported in the PZPR theoretical organ *Nowe Drogi,* Warsaw, September-October 1948.

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

—And what is this?
—A breeding farm for sacrificial goats . . .

—From *Szpilki* (Warsaw), October 14, 1956

Tito. The "natives" were guilty of regarding what Moscow had intended as a mere tactical policy of the moment as a permanent operative principle, and they were not sufficiently converted to the idea of accepting Soviet leadership without question. In the end Gomulka was obliged to confess his cardinal sin in these revealing words:

The core of my rightist, nationalist complex must have been my attitude to the Soviet Union—to the CPSU(b). . . . My attitude should be reduced not so much to . . . the relationship between the CPSU(b) and the Polish Workers' Party as to the relationship between Poland and the USSR as states. . . . It never entered my head that Poland could progress along the way to socialism without being supported by the Soviet Union, but . . . it was difficult for me to shift my attitude as regards the Soviet Union to the ideological party plane. [4]

BETWEEN September 1948 and December 1949, three sweeping purges were carried out in the PZPR to eliminate those who shared or sympathized with Gomulka's deviationist views. The purges affected practically one-fourth of the party membership, their scope and intensity clearly reflecting Moscow's conviction that "national bolshevism" represented a potentially powerful and dangerous force in the Polish party.

On the higher level, four of Gomulka's close supporters were initially demoted from full to alternate members of the Central Committee, and one—Bienkowski—was dropped altogether. Spychalski was replaced in the fall of 1949 as Vice-Minister of Defense, and both he and Zenon Kliszko were expelled from the Central Committee at its November 1949 plenum, which also completed Gomulka's elimination from the directing organs of the party by expelling him from the Central Committee and barring him from all further participation in party activities.

Of those associated with Gomulka, the Stalinists singled out Spychalski for particularly vehement attack, evidently because he enjoyed considerable popularity among the party rank and file and therefore was regarded as potentially dangerous. The accusations brought against him were that, as intelligence chief of the People's Army, he had permitted enemies of the party and of the Soviet Union to occupy responsible positions in the party machine and the armed forces; and that he had allowed—in the circumlutory language of the Central Committee—"valuable Soviet specialists to depart prematurely" from Poland. Spychalski, in his desperate efforts at self-defense, sought to disassociate himself from Gomulka, but to no avail. As Defense Vice-Minister he was replaced by Edward Ochab, whom Stalin had once praised as a "Bolshevik with sharp teeth."

ON August 2, 1951, Gomulka was arrested and spent the next five years under house detention near Warsaw. On several occasions the Soviet leaders, including Stalin himself, sought to ascertain from the new bosses of the PZPR when Gomulka would be brought to trial—and presumably liquidated in the

[4] *Nowe Drogi*, November 1949.

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same fashion as his counterparts in the other satellites —Rajk in Hungary, Kostov in Bulgaria, and Slansky in Czechoslovakia. The answer invariably was that the preparatory investigations were not yet completed. This was only part of the truth: in reality the investigators had failed to break Gomulka and make him admit his guilt. Moreover, he had threatened, if placed on trial, to bare the wartime secrets of the PPR, notably its collaboration with the Nazi Gestapo.

Stalin's death and the "thaw" that followed paved the way for Gomulka's ultimate rehabilitation in the wake of the Twentieth CPSU Congress decisions repudiating Stalinist policies and formally approving "Separate paths to socialism." The reactions of the broad masses of the Polish party in the October crisis, when they successfully restored Gomulka to the helm on a wave of almost universal acclaim, showed that even the purging of a quarter of its membership had not innoculated the PZPR against nationalist tendencies. It had merely driven them underground to take still deeper root.

M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI

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The Moscow Trials "Revised"

FOR many years Soviet propagandists and pro-Soviet Western observers presented "Soviet justice" as a forward step in the advancement of legal science. Thus, the British jurist D. N. Pritt wrote, in a contemporary eulogy of the Moscow purge trials of the 1930's, that "the judicature and the prosecuting attorney of the USSR [Andrei Vyshinsky] have established their reputation among the legal systems of the world."[1] Pritt was not at all disconcerted by the singular fact, unparalleled in Western jurisprudence, that the accused in the Soviet trials did not raise a finger to defend themselves, but instead confessed with seeming eagerness to the most heinous crimes. The Soviet Government, he blandly stated, would have preferred that all or most of the accused should have pleaded not guilty and contested the case."[2]

The naivete, or willful blindness, of such statements has long been apparent. As early as 1937, an independent commission of inquiry conducted an exhaustive investigation into the Moscow trials of 1936 and 1937 and found them to be clearcut travesties of justice.[3] The commission's findings were bolstered by an ever-mounting accumulation of evidence regarding the methods employed to produce the victims' obviously abnormal eagerness to sign their own death warrants.

Today not even the most naive apologist can continue his self-deception. At the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU the myth was broken for all time when Nikita Khrushchev, in a secret report to a closed session of the Congress, revealed the depths to which Soviet "justice" had sunk:

Stalin originated the concept "enemy of the people." This term automatically rendered unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proven; . . . The formula was specifically introduced for the purpose of physically annihilating such individuals. . . .[4]

IT is significant, however, that, in denouncing "violations of socialist law", Khrushchev made no direct mention either of the show trial as such, or of its exportation to the satellites. His remarks about Zinoviev and Kamenev and about the "annihilation" of Lenin's closest colleagues as "enemies of the party" were furthermore clear attempts to restrict the discussion to "violations of socialist law" in the period following Kirov's assassination in December 1934—to the great trials and purges of the thirties.[5]

This effort is a transparent indication that the present collective leadership cannot make a decisive, radical break with their Stalinist past. It is to Stalin that the present Soviet leaders owe their positions, and it was during his reign that their methods of "governing" and dispensing "justice" were decisively molded. That is why Khrushchev and his colleagues will not admit that the genesis of the Stalin-type inquisitorial

[1] *The Moscow Trial Was Fair* (London: *Russia Today*, n.d.).

[2] *The Zinoviev Trial* (London: Gollancz, 1936).

[3] This Commission was headed by the noted American philosopher, John Dewey. Its findings were published in two books: *The Case of Leon Trotsky* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1937); and *Not Guilty* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1938).

[4] *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism: A Selection Of Documents* [hereinafter cited as *The Anti-Stalin Campaign*] (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p. 13.

[5] For a full discussion of these trials see this author's *The Modern Inquisition* (London: Allan Wingate, 1953).

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trial goes much farther back than 1934, indeed, as far back as 1922.

THE idea of exploiting the judicial trial of political opponents for the purpose of "educating" the masses was first given concrete expression in 1922, when a trial of 22 prominent members of the Social Revolutionary Party was staged. At that time the technique of the show trial had not been perfected, and only ten police stooges consented to play the role of cringing penitents and government propagandists. At first, the state was content with this number and even permitted the rest to defend themselves stoutly. They openly proclaimed their political convictions and even refused to recognize the court. Just prior to the trial, the Bolsheviks entered into an agreement in Berlin with representatives of the international socialist movement by which several prominent socialists were invited to participate in the defense; and in the early stages of the trial they were very active in behalf of the accused. As the trial progressed, however, the intolerable contradictions between accepted conceptions of justice and a Soviet-sponsored political trial were revealed. Bit by bit the essential elements of the show trial, with which the world later became familiar, emerged.

The presiding judge struck the keynote for the proceedings by declaring that the court would be guided not by objective considerations but by the interests of the government. During the course of the trial Bukharin declared the Berlin agreement null and void, and this, coupled with the prosecution's obstructive tactics, caused the foreign socialists to withdraw. Perhaps most important in the development of the show trial, however, was the first utilization of the technique of agitating against the accused outside of court. Yuri Pyatakov, the president of the tribunal, spoke at one of the mass demonstrations, as did Bukharin, who applauded the role played in the trial by the ten who had "confessed".[6]

IN the course of the next few years the show trial was gradually brought to a high stage of perfection. "Evidence" was manufactured and, by means of inhuman tortures, the accused were brought into court "prepared" to cooperate in arranging their own destruction. During the course of the so-called Shakhty trial (1928), for example, a group of engineers, personifying the "bourgeois specialists", took the blame for the country's chronic economic ills and accused foreign "interventionist circles" of directing their sabotage.[7] By 1930 the technique had been further perfected, and during the Industrial Party trial every single one of the accused confessed to "planned" sabotage in drafting or implementing the First Five-Year Plan. One of the witnesses, brought in under heavy GPU guard, was Professor Osadchy, formerly a member of the CEC (Central Economic Council) of the Supreme Soviet, and assistant chairman of the State Planning Commission. Incredible as it may seem, Osadchy, who was one of the prosecutors at the Shakhty trial, confessed to having plotted with the very men whom he had sentenced to death in 1928![8]

STALIN'S speech at the Sixteenth Congress (June-July, 1930) gave at least the outward rationale for all the great Moscow trials.[9] His thesis was that whenever the contradictions inherent within the capitalist system grow acute, the bourgeoisie tries to solve them by turning on the Soviet Union. By the bourgeoisie Stalin meant primarily foreign nations, but his main purpose was to justify the purge of internal opposition to his rule. The vast international "plots" which were uncovered regularly involved certain native Communists; often these were among the most celebrated of the revolutionary heroes, their "crimes" consisting in their opposition to Stalin's dictatorship. Without respect to their previous service, these men were condemned as saboteurs working in collaboration with the outside enemy to wreck the economy of the Soviet Union.

Thus, the Great Purge, as well as the thousands of unpublicized local purges, served the double purpose of removing those who opposed Stalin and of providing for the population an "explanation" of the continuing low standard of living. Vyshinsky made the point in the following manner:

It is now clear why there are interruptions of supplies here and there, why with our riches and abundance of products, there is a shortage first of one thing and then of another. It is these traitors who are responsible.[10]

Vyshinsky also underlined the connection between the various trials. Stalin's thesis had been proved, he said: all the trials had uncovered ". . . systematically conducted espionage . . . . the devilish work of foreign intelligence . . ."[11]

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[6] The most complete record of this trial is in V. S. Voitinski, *The Twelve Who Are About To Die* (Berlin, 1922). The death sentences passed against the accused were never carried out.

[7] No official records of this trial have been published. Of secondary sources, the best are H. H. Tiltman, *The Terror in Europe* (New York, 1932), and Eugene Lyons, *Assignment in Utopia* (New York, 1937), especially pp. 114-133.

[8] Andrew Rothstein (ed.), *Wreckers on Trial* (London: Modern Books, 1931).

[9] Some of the sources on the most important Moscow trials are the following: On the 1931 Menshevik trial *The Menshevik Trial* (New York, 1932); on the 1933 Metropolitan-Vickers Industrial Company Trial— *The Case of N. P. Vitvitsky . . . [and others] Charged With Wrecking Activities at Power Stations in the Soviet Union* (Moscow, 1933), 3 vols.; on the 1936 trial—*The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre* (Moscow, 1936); on the 1937 trial—*Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Trotskyite Centre* (Moscow, 1937); on the 1938 trial—*Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet 'Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites'* (Moscow, 1938).

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 636-7.

[11] *Ibid.*

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— A więc przyznaje się oskarżony do popełnienia kilku morderstw i gwałtów?
— A któż z nas, panie sędzio, nie popełnił błędów w przeszłości...

—So the accused admits having committed several murders and acts of violence?

—And who among us, Your Judgeship, hasn't committed mistakes in the past? . . .

—From *Szpilki* (Warsaw), November 11,1956.

Characteristically, although it was ostensibly against Stalin's thesis and its implications that Khrushchev railed at the Twentieth Congress, his anger was aroused most of all by the fact that Stalin's wrath had been turned against the party itself:

Using Stalin's formulation . . . the provocateurs who had infiltrated the state security organs together with conscienceless careerists . . . [launched] mass terror against Party cadres. . . . It should suffice to say that the number of arrests based on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes had grown ten times between 1936 and 1937. [12]

Khrushchev summed up the Stalin era in anguished tones:

In the main, and in actuality, the only proof of guilt used, against all norms of current legal science, was the 'confession' of the accused himself; and, as subsequent probing proved, 'Confessions' were acquired through physical pressures against the accused. [13]

KHRUSHCHEV'S speech is a masterpiece of hypocrisy. To be sure, of the 1966 delegates to the Seventeenth Party Congress (1934), 1108 were arrested on charges of counterrevolutionary activity. But Khrushchev well knows that it was not a question of "subsequent probing": every leading Communist in the Soviet Union knew at the time what was going on. They were aware that the "confessions" were shot through with contradictions and obvious absurdities; they knew that the trials were frame-ups.

As a matter of fact, Khrushchev's speech itself corroborates our previous evidence that the Politburo was well aware of what was going on:

At the February-March Central Committee Plenum in 1937 many members actually questioned the rightness of the established course regarding mass repressions under the pretext of combating 'two-facedness.' [14]

Khrushchev thus confirms that opposition to Stalin's iron-heel policy was expressed even within the Politburo. People who had employed the most despicable methods against both non-party and party opponents began to voice "doubts" when the police terror menaced them. Among those who ventured to speak up in 1937 was Pavel Postyshev, candidate member of the Politburo. Indeed, Khrushchev said that Postyshev expressed his doubts "most ably", as did Stanislav Kossior, a member of the Politburo—both were liquidated. Other prominent Stalinist victims of the monster they themselves helped create were Vlas Chubar, Yan Rudzutak, Grigory Petrovsky, and Robert Eikhe: all men of the Lenin era who had thrown in their lot with Stalin in his struggle for power.

HOW was it, then, that Molotov, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Khrushchev and others survived? They saved themselves either by keeping their mouths shut or, where their closeness to Stalin made this impossible, by sedulously fostering the cult of the "brilliant leader." Certainly Khrushchev was not unaware of what was going on. Kossior, for example, was purged in the Ukraine while he was closely associated with Khrushchev.

Without speculating about the possible splits and rivalries within the top leadership of the CPSU revealed by the varying degrees of vehemence with which individual Soviet leaders condemned Stalin's "cult of personality", the central goal of the leadership as a whole is perfectly obvious. Khrushchev and his supporters are vitally concerned with "rehabilitating" the party and strengthening its authority *vis-à-vis* the police apparatus. The terrors of the Stalinist era left party cadres either demoralized and spiritless or, much worse, cynically and brutally opportunistic. In any event, the leadership felt that the support of the new generation of Communists—the managerial caste and the intellectuals—required assurances that the days of arbitrary terror were over. In Khrushchev's words:

Arbitrary behavior by one person encouraged and permitted arbitrariness in others. Mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people, execution without trial and without normal investigation created conditions of insecurity, fear and even desperation. [15]

[12] *The Anti-Stalin Campaign*, p. 30.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

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THE exportation of the macabre and revolting confessional trial to Eastern Europe was never much of a success. The process that had transformed the CPSU into a terrorized and docile instrument of the leader took 14 years; in Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary it was telescoped into less than four years—somewhat longer in Czechoslovakia and Rumania. During this time the weak satellite Communist parties (only in Czechoslovakia could the Communists claim any sizeable following) were deprived of their ablest leaders. It was clear from the trials, moreover, that these leaders were imprisoned and executed because they attempted to stand up to the Soviet Union and that the leaders who remained were mere Soviet satraps. The confession trials of "national Communists" therefore destroyed what little basis the Communist parties had for claiming to represent national interests, or even the interests of the industrial workers. At the same time, they failed dismally to destroy either national sentiment among the people or Titoist tendencies within the rank-and-file of the Communist parties.

Quite on the contrary, there can be no doubt that the confession trials in Eastern Europe played a great role in enhancing anti-Soviet feeling and in undermining the Communist parties' faith in themselves. The enormous crowds that attended the reinternment of Rajk in Hungary after his posthumous rehabilitation were symptomatic of the anti-Soviet mood that had been generated by the "educational" methods of Soviet-inspired "justice". The bloodless revolt in Poland and the heroic uprising of the Hungarian workers, peasants, and intellectuals were due in large part to the exposure of Soviet methods and aims which resulted from the export of the "modern inquisition". The people of the satellite nations share with the Russian people a deep and bitter hatred of the secret police, and a deathless desire to end the insufferable horrors which the confession trial represented.

* * *

That the Soviet leaders were, and remain, keenly aware of this was implicit in their repudiation at the Twentieth Congress of the Stalinist inquisition and in the gradual steps that have been instituted to correct some of the more objectionable features of the police and judicial apparatus. They obviously are attempting to restore public confidence in a party and system that had become thoroughly and openly compromised. In so doing, however, they paradoxically underlined still further the bankruptcy of the system that claimed to have produced that "glorious workers' paradise", the "most advanced country in the world", and they reveal nakedly their inability to cast off the imprint of this system of terror and "educational justice."

HUGO DEWAR

Mr. Dewar, a noted analyst of Soviet affairs, has written a comprehensive study of Communist purge trials, The Modern Inquisition *(London: Allan Wingate, 1953).*

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Correspondence

Editor's Note: Readers are welcome to send communications dealing with matters discussed in *Problems of Communism.* Letters should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism,* U. S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington 25, D. C.

SOVIET ACTION AND UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES

THROUGH most of Mr. Lowenthal's article, "Revolution over Eastern Europe" (*Problems of Communism,* No. 6, 1956) I found his line of reasoning sound and convincing. Near the close, however, he introduced two arguments which, to me at least, do not ring true in the light of the past Soviet behavior.

First, Mr. Lowenthal tells us that the Soviet repressive action in Hungary was delayed while Moscow weighed the effect that it would have on the uncommitted countries of Asia. Second, he says, force was eventually decided upon largely because Moscow could expect the "Anglo-French action against Egypt" to divert Asia's attention from Soviet actions in Eastern Europe.

Let us consider the latter point first. Whatever may be one's opinion of the Anglo-French action as such, events show that the Russian military machine was already gearing itself for action before the Egyptian landings. As for the first point, the sequence of events suggests that the momentary hesitation before Soviet armed intervention began in earnest was influenced by a factor of much greater weight, in Moscow's eyes, than the opinion of uncommitted Asia.

This factor was the attitude of Peiping. Only a short while earlier, Communist China had made no bones about its sympathy and support for Gomulka and his "national communism" in Poland. What it would say to all-out repression in Hungary was therefore of some concern to Moscow. But, by November 4, when Kadar was installed in place of Nagy to the accompaniment of exploding Soviet bombs and shells, Moscow was evidently sure that Peiping was prepared to back to the full Soviet action to restore a die-hard Stalinist leadership in Hungary. This was publicly confirmed by an editorial published in the Chinese Communist central organ, *Jen-min Jih-pao,* on November 5: in the same breath the paper acclaimed the Kadar puppet regime and approved the "support of the Soviet armed forces" which had brought it into being. In this connection it is worth recalling that Kadar, only a couple of months earlier, had headed the Hungarian delegation to the Eighth Congress of the Chinese CP in Peiping.

Compared to the attitude of its major Communist ally, Moscow can hardly have accorded much weight to the opinion of uncommitted Asiatic nations. Indeed, is there much evidence from the past to indicate that fear of non-Communist opinion, Asiatic or any other, has effectively swayed Soviet action within its own orbit? Moscow was not deterred from sending Red Army tanks into action in Eastern Germany in June 1953. Nor were any of the mass Soviet-ordered deportations of the past twenty years deterred by the moral condemnations of the uncommitted nations. If, in fact, the Soviet leaders were so sensitive to Asiatic opinion, it seems strange that they did not hesitate to send General Serov, the organizer of many of the deportations, to India and Burma last year.

True, the Soviets are anxious to obtain and keep the sympathies of the uncommitted countries. If they can do this at no great sacrifice to themselves, that is fine. But when their own interests demand it, fear of alienating such sympathies does not deter them from being tough.

Leamington Spa, England — **John Clews**

Mr Lowenthal replies: Mr. Clews expresses disagreement with my alleged view that the Soviet leaders decided to use force against Hungary "largely because Moscow could expect the Anglo-French action against Egypt to divert Asia's attention from Soviet actions in Eastern Europe." That view I do not hold; in the article to which he refers I wrote, on the contrary, that the restraining effect of political considerations concerning Asia "was bound to reach its limits at the point at which the threat of the loss of the Soviet empire loomed larger than the threat of the loss of sympathies in Asia. The Soviet leaders would rather accept a temporary setback in the competition for uncommitted countries than put up with the total loss of their own possessions in half a continent." I take it that Mr. Clews agrees with this. My only mention of the Suez adventure follows after the above sentences. Having stated what I regard as the fundamental reasons for the Soviet decision, I add that *"moreover"* the Anglo-French action largely nullified the impact of the Asian consideration—in other words, that it gratuitously eased the Russian decision and diminished its political cost to the Soviets. But Mr. Clews apparently would not admit that consideration for the opinion of uncommitted Asia could ever have weighed in the balance at all, because there is no proof from the past that fear of non-Communist opinion has had any serious effect on Moscow actions in its own Communist orbit. Here there is indeed some difference; for I believe that at

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certain times—precisely in periods of "coexistence"—regard for non-Communist opinion has indeed influenced actions within the Communist world. For instance, it was a major factor in Lenin's decision in November 1920 to offer economic "concessions" on Soviet soil to foreign capitalists, the sole reason for the "dissolution" of the Comintern in 1943, and probably the main cause for the recent end of the Cominform. Of course, the influence has been limited and often confined to appearances; but the point is precisely that, once world conditions impose the strategy of competitive coexistence on Moscow, it cannot neglect appearances without suffering some loss. Mr. Clews seems to think that the Soviets act according to an unchanging book of rules, whatever the situation, and that our main task is to proclaim that we have discovered the rules and will not believe in any change. I think that they are subject, like the rest of us, to all the internal and external pressures of a changing world.

MARXIST PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

In his interesting article, "Marxism and the Study of History" [*Problems of Communism*, No. 5, 1956] Mr. Trevor-Roper shows with great clarity that the Marxist philosophy of history fails to provide an adequate explanation or interpretation of the historical process. His analysis would have been still more complete had he also pointed out that the Marxist historical philosophy is built upon an ambiguity, a fact exposed by Mr. John Plamenatz in his *German Marxism and Russian Communism* (Longmans, Green, London, 1954).

Marx saw the progress of history as a series of class conflicts deriving from economic "contradictions" within society. In the preface to his *Critique of Political Economy*, he wrote:

At a certain stage of their development the material forces of production in society come into conflict with the existing relations of production.

The "relations of production," which themselves originate in, and are determined by, the "forces of production", eventually become "fetters" upon those forces. As Mr. Plamenatz says, "the dependent variable begins to impede the free operation of the variable upon which it depends," and nowhere in historical materialism is there an explanation of this logical ambiguity.

Sutton, England **Arthur Priest**

TITO AND THE SATELLITES

Mr. Ernest Halperin, in his article, "Is Russia Going Titoist?" [No. 5, 1956] makes an interesting case for the thesis that the Kremlin's post-Stalin attitude of deference toward Communist Yugoslavia, though recently weakened as a result of Tito's criticism of Soviet action in Hungary, reflects much more than a mere political rapprochement, and that strong forces are actually impelling the Moscow leadership toward the adoption, for the USSR itself, of certain essential features of Titoism. Whether this thesis is correct or not, there is no question that Tito's star has risen considerably in the Communist firmament. At the very least, many Western observers see in the pilgrimages of various satellite delegations to Belgrade—not to mention the rise of Gomulka in Poland and the abortive reign of Nagy in Hungary—a sign that Tito may emerge as the guiding light for the Communist nations of Eastern Europe.

As one who lived in Yugoslavia from 1928 to 1947, I should like to set forth the reasons why I consider such predictions of a Titoist-led East European bloc unlikely to materialize. The first lies in the deeply-ingrained antagonisms and mutual mistrust which the peoples of the Balkan nations, as distinguished from their Communist leaders, entertain toward one another. How, for example, would the average Bulgarian react to his government's adoption of a policy of following Yugoslav leadership? His feelings can be understood only if we go back to the Balkan Wars, which liberated the small countries of this area from the Turkish yoke. After victory had been achieved Bulgaria was turned upon by her former allies, and only a fraction of Macedonia was allotted to her despite the fight she had waged for her brethren there. From that time onward, Macedonia has been a perennial obstacle to Yugoslav-Bulgarian understanding, and the Bulgarians today remain deeply distrustful of Yugoslav protestations of friendship. One of the many manifestations of this animosity was the sneering ridicule with which the Bulgarian public greeted the "eternal non-aggression pact" entered into by their government with Yugoslavia prior to World War II in response to the blandishments of pro-Nazi Yugoslav Premier Milan Stojadinovic.

Similar mistrust and animosity characterize the Hungarian popular attitude toward Yugoslavia, again the product of deep-rooted historic causes and, in particular, the incorporation into Yugoslavia of the Banat with its large Hungarian-speaking population. Apart from such feelings toward Yugoslavia, the antagonisms which divide the satellite peoples against one another—Bulgarians against Rumanians and Rumanians against Hungarians—also militate against a common front of these nations under Titoist guidance.

Let us turn now from the feelings of the peoples to the probable attitude of the satellite Communist leaders. There is not the least doubt that during the early postwar years they were bound together by common interest and common problems in establishing and consolidating their rule according to the unified Stalinist pattern. Cooperation, however, soon began to fade as these compulsions became less pressing and the mutual distrust so characteristic of the Communists in their relations with one another reasserted itself. It can safety be asserted that Tito, prior to his excommunication by Stalin, was looked upon by the Communist leaders in the satellites with jealousy and dislike because of his favored position in Moscow. When he defied the Kremlin, the satellite leaders quickly obeyed Stalin's command and obsequiously expressed their loathing for Titoist deviationism.

Now, with Stalin and Stalinism officially condemned in Moscow, Tito has been restored to a position of even

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greater influence than formerly with the Soviet rulers, and most of those satellite leaders who reviled him at Moscow's bidding have been punished by demotion or explusion from the party unless they reversed themselves quickly and completely enough to win Belgrade's pardon. No doubt the satellite leaders will now pay the required deference to Tito, but the latter probably will become anew the object of concealed envy and dislike in the satellite capitals.

Thus, despite the current tendency of the Communist East European regimes to emulate Tito in asserting greater independence from Moscow, this observer strongly doubts that such a tendency reflects any increased possibility of Belgrade's becoming the new command center for the satellites. The sentiments of both the peoples and the Communist leaders, I believe, militate against it. And the new breath of independence that is sweeping the satellites will probably prove just as inimical to Tito's ambitions in this direction as any move to restore unified Soviet control.

Vienna, Austria **Dr. Gustav Braun**

The September-October issue's article "Is Russia Going Titoist" [by Ernst Halperin] is mis-titled, as it is actually a valuable analysis of Tito's ideological semantics. But it is one of the best things you have published.

Bridgeport, Connecticut **Joseph S. Roucek**

[*Chairman, Depts. of Political Science & Sociology University of Bridgeport*]

IN FORTHCOMING ISSUES OF PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

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Poland: Problems and Prospects, *by Immanuel Birnbaum*
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